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Abstract
Geometric complexity theory (GCT) is an approach to the P vs. NP and re-
lated problems. This article gives its complexity theoretic overview without
assuming any background in algebraic geometry or representation theory.
1 Introduction
Geometric complexity theory (GCT) is an approach to the P vs. NP [14,
29, 33], permanent vs. determinant [57] and related problems (Figure 1)
suggested in a series of articles we call GCTlocal [36], GCT1-8 [41]-[49], and
GCTflip [39]. There seems to be a fundamental root difficulty, which we
call the complexity barrier, that must be overcome by any proof technique
that could settle these problems. Not surprisingly this barrier turns out to
be extremely formidable. All the mathematical effort in GCT in a sense
goes towards crossing this barrier. In fact, even formalization of this barrier
turns out to be quite nonelementary and cannot be done at present without
algebraic geometry and representation theory. The main result of GCT
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Figure 1: Complexity Classes (no proper containments are known)
[GCT6] provides such a formalization and a mathematical programme for
crossing the barrier, which has been partially implemented in [GCT6,7,8,11]–
this turns out to be quite a nonelementary affair. This paper provides an
informal exposition of the complexity barrier to explain why it may be the
root difficulty of the P vs. NP problem and what makes it so formidable
so that the need for these nonelementary techniques that enter into GCT to
tackle this barrier becomes clear at a high level.
But before we turn to this barrier, let us first see why the earlier known
barriers such as the relativization [7], natural-proof [55], algebraic degree
[GCTlocal] and algebrization [2] barriers do not really capture the main
source of difficulties that needs to be overcome by an eventual proof. This
became clear after these barriers were bypassed in the early papers of GCT
[GCTlocal,GCT1,GCT2]. Let us now explain how these barriers were by-
passed in these early papers, and then explain why the root difficulty still
remained after bypassing them.
Let us begin with [GCTlocal] that proves a special case of the P 6=
NC conjecture called the P 6= NC result without bit operations. This may
be considered to be the first concrete lower bound result of GCT. It was
proved using a weaker form of GCT’s strategy for crossing the complexity
barrier (discussed below) much before it was formalized in [GCTflip,GCT6].
The result says that the maxflow problem cannot be solved in the PRAM
model without bit operations in polylogarithmic time using polynomially
many processors. At present this may be the only superpolynomial lower
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bound that is a special case of any of the fundamental separation problems
in Figure 1 and holds unconditionally in a natural and realistic model of
computation that is heavily used in practice. Furthermore, as explained
in Section 6, its proof technique is fundamentally different from the proof
techniques to which the relativization and natural-proof barriers apply.
But that is not enough. Because GCTlocal pointed out a third barrier
in complexity theory, which we shall call the algebraic degree barrier, but
which was not called a barrier there for the reasons explained below. This
basically says that any low degree or degree based proof technique, such as
the one there, which associates with a computation algebraic objects and
then reasons solely on the basis of the degrees of those objects will not work
for unrestricted fundamental separation problems. As far as we can see, the
recent algebrization barrier [2] also suggests something similar 1. Hence it
is not treated separately in this article.
GCTlocal also suggested an idea for crossing the algebraic degree bar-
rier: namely, associate with complexity classes algebraic varieties with group
actions that capture the symmetries of computation and then reason on the
basis of the deeper representation theoretic structure of these varieties rather
than just their degrees.
This led to the investigation in GCT1 and 2, which suggested an ap-
proach to the fundamental lower bound problems via algebraic geometry
and representation theory. This approach bypasses the relativization, natu-
ral proof and algebraic degree barriers simultaneously as explained in Sec-
tions 7 and 8. In contrast, it seems [2] that the earlier known techniques
for proving lower bounds in complexity theory may not bypass these well
studied barriers simultaneously.
Unfortunately after GCT1 and 2, wherein the earlier known barriers
were thus bypassed, it became clear that the root difficulty of the P vs. NP
problem still remained after bypassing these barriers and the main battle on
the P vs. NP problem really begins only after bypassing them.
In retrospect, this should not be surprising. The relativization, natural-
proof, and algebraic-degree barriers cannot be expected to capture the root
difficulty of the P vs. NP problem.
To see why, let us begin with the algebraic degree barrier in [GCTlocal].
It applies to the low degree techniques of the kind used in that paper. All
1But on the basis of lower bounds which may not be as closely related with the funda-
mental separation problems in Figure 1 as the P 6= NC result without bit operations in
GCTlocal.
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these techniques are in one way or the other related to the fundamental
Bezout’s theorem in algebraic geometry and the notion of a degree of a
polynomial (we also include the low degree techniques used in other areas
of complexity theory in this category). Though this is a nontrivial area of
mathematics, it is still very small compared to the whole of mathematics.
Hence, we can say that this barrier is local in the sense that it applies to
a very restricted class of techniques in mathematics. If a proof technique
does not belong to this class, the barrier is simply bypassed, i.e., is not
applicable. In this sense, it is not really a barrier–if by a barrier we mean
a conceptual obstacle that any eventual proof of the P 6= NP conjecture
would need to overcome regardless of which areas of mathematics it goes
through–but rather a trap that a proof technique has to avoid. This is why
it was not called a barrier in GCTlocal.
We can also say that the algebraic degree barrier is primarily mathemat-
ical in the sense that low degree is a purely a mathematical notion, there is
no complexity theory in it, and though it is very useful in complexity theory,
this barrier is really a statement about the restricted nature of these math-
ematical techniques rather than about the complexity theoretic difficulty of
the P vs. NP problem.
In a similar way, we may say that the relativization and natural proof
barriers are also local and mathematical. Mathematical because the natural
proof barrier is generally regarded as applying to proof techniques that work
for most functions and most is a mathematical notion, so also the notion of
relativization.
Now we can explain why local mathematical barriers cannot be expected
to capture the root difficulty of the P vs. NP problem. Because this prob-
lem is a universal complexity-theoretic statement about all of mathematics.
Namely, if this conjecture fails to hold, every theorem in mathematics that
has a proof of reasonable length can be proved efficiently by a computer
in time polynomial in the length of its shortest proof. No other known
conjecture in mathematics has such stunning mathematical sweep. Given
the universal complexity theoretic nature of this problem, it then stands
to reason that the main barrier towards this problem–the root cause of its
difficulty–should also be universal and complexity theoretic, where by a uni-
versal barrier we mean a barrier that every approach has to cross regardless
of which areas of mathematics it goes through. In other words, a local bar-
rier is like a guiding post which tells us what must not be done, and hence
must be bypassed, whereas a universal barrier cannot be bypassed no matter
what, because it tells us what must be done, i.e., it has to be crossed. A
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local barrier only rules out a restricted area of mathematics. Regardless of
how many restricted areas of mathematics we rule out in this way, that still
rules out only a small subarea of mathematics, tells us a few things that
we should not do, but gives us essentially no idea about what to do given
that the P vs. NP problem is a statement about all of mathematics. At
some point we have to turn our attention from what is not to be done to
what is to be done and identify the root universal and complexity theoretic
difficulty of this problem; i.e., a universal complexity theoretic barrier.
The complexity barrier described in this article seems to be this universal
complexity theoretic barrier. Crossing this barrier basically means answer-
ing formally the folklore question: why should the P vs. NP problem not
preclude its own proof by standing in the way of any approach, and hence,
why should any given approach be feasible even theoretically? The key
phrase here is answering formally. This means: (1) fix an appropriate proof
strategy (approach) and formalize the question by defining precisely and for-
mally what theoretically feasibility of this fixed proof strategy means, and
(2) then answer the formalized question by proving that this proof strategy
is indeed theoretically feasible as per this definition. In other words, for-
malization of the informal folklore question as in step (1) is itself a part of
the challenge. If this is carried out, we say that the complexity barrier has
been formalized in this approach. The P 6= NP conjecture seems so severe
that for most proof strategies it may not even be possible to carry out step
(1). That is, formal definition theoretical feasibility may be possible for
only some exceptional proof strategies. This is why just formalization of the
complexity barrier seems to be such a challenge.
The most obvious and natural abstract strategy to cross the complex-
ity barrier, called the flip [GCT6,GCTflip], is suggested by the P vs. NP
problem itself. It is to go for its explicit proof. By this we mean a proof
that shows existence of proof certificates of hardness for an NP-complete
function f(X) = f(x1, . . . , xn) that are short of poly(n) size and easy to
verify in poly(n) time; i.e., the problem of verification of the proof certifi-
cates belongs to P and hence is theoretically feasible. In other words, the
flip seeks proof certificates for nonmembership of f(X) in P akin to those
for its membership in NP . Abstractly, GCT is any geometric approach to
the P vs. NP and related problems based on the flip; i.e., on construction of
explicit proofs. Such explicit proofs based on the specific proof certificates
defined in GCT1,2 and 6, called geometric obstructions, exist as per the
explicit proof conjecture [GCT6]. The main result of GCT is a complete for-
malization [GCT6] of the complexity barrier (in this specific approach) and a
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mathematical programme [GCT6,7,8,11] to cross the formalized complexity
barrier via the flip for the P vs. NP and related problems.
This article gives a complexity theoretic overview of GCT outlining these
developments.
This also allows us to place GCT in the landscape of all possible ap-
proaches to cross this main barrier in complexity theory. For that, we define
GCT abstractly as any geometric approach based on the flip towards the P
vs. NP and related problems, where geometric means based on the sym-
metries of a judiciously chosen f(X). The present formal GCT is one such
approach. Though the flip is the most obvious and natural way to cross the
complexity barrier, paradoxically it also turns out to be very counterintuitive
and hard to believe at the same time. The formalization of the complexity
barrier mentioned above basically provides a concrete mathematical pro-
gram to implement the flip and says that the flip should be feasible however
counterintuitive it may seem. The main goal of this article is to justify this
from the complexity theoretic perspective. Two concrete lower bounds of
GCT mentioned above play a crucial role in this justification.
The complementary article [40] gives a mathematical overview of GCT
based on the IAS lectures without getting into the meta issues concerning
barriers. The reader who wishes to get a concrete mathematical picture of
the approach before worrying about such issues may wish to read that article
first. On the other hand, the reader who wishes to know the root difficulty
of the P vs. NP and related problems and the need for nonelementary
techniques before getting into any mathematics may wish to read this article
first. We leave the choice to the readers. See also the recent article [12] for
an external mathematical review of GCT1 and 2.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The complexity barrier
is discussed in Section 2, high level statement of the main result of GCT–a
formalization of the complexity barrier–in Section 3. Abstract flip is de-
scribed in Section 5, the P 6= NC result without bit operations in Section 6,
the meaning of the phrase geometric in Section 7, why GCT bypasses the
earlier known local barriers simultaneously in Section 8, elaboration of the
main result in Sections 10 and 12, and finally the question–is the complex-
ity barrier really so formidable?–in Section 13. Sections 7-12 constitute an
extended abstract of Chapter 1 in [40].
Remark: Natural in GCT means explicit unlike in [55] where it means prob-
abilistic. The meaning should be clear from the context.
Acknowledgements: The author is deeply grateful to Janos Simon without
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whom this paper would not exist. The paper grew out of a series of discus-
sions on GCT with him over the last year. The goal was to communicate to
him the root difficulty that GCT is trying to overcome and its basic plan for
doing so. That root difficulty is the complexity barrier described here. This
paper basically consists of answers to his tough and insightful questions.
The author is also grateful to Scott Aaronson, Laci Babai, Josh Grochow,
Russell Impagliazzo, Hari Narayanan, Partha Niyogi, Sasha Razborov, and
Avi Wigderson for helpful discussions.
2 Complexity barrier
In this section we describe the complexity barrier.
Towards that end, let us fix anNP -complete function f(X) = f(x1, . . . , xn),
say SAT. The goal of the nonuniform P vs. NP problem is to show that
there does not exist a circuit C = C(X) of size m = poly(n) that computes
f(X), n → ∞. Symbolically, let fC(X) denote the function computed by
C. Then we want to prove that
∀n,m = poly(n) ∀C∃x : f(X) 6= fC(X). (1)
Equivalently, the goal is to prove:
(IOH): For every large enough n, and m = poly(n), there exists a trivial
obstruction (i.e. a “proof-certificate” of hardness) to efficient computation
of f(X). Here by a trivial obstruction we mean a table (cf. Figure 2) that
lists for every small C a counterexample X such that f(X) 6= fC(X).
The number of rows of this table is equal to the number of circuits C’s of
size m = poly(n). Thus the size of this table is exponential; i.e., 2O(poly(n)).
The time to verify whether a given table is a trivial obstruction is also
exponential, and so is the time of the obvious algorithm to decide if such a
table exists for given n andm. From the complexity theoretic viewpoint, this
is an infeasible (inefficient) task. So we call this trivial, brute force strategy
of proving the nonuniform P vs. NP conjecture, based on existence of trivial
obstructions, a theoretically infeasible strategy–it is really just a restatement
of the original problem. Hence, the terminology IOH (Infeasible Obstruction
Hypothesis)–we also say that IOH is theoretically infeasible.
Any proof strategy for the P vs. NP problem has to answer the following
question:
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Figure 2: Trivial obstruction
Question 2.1 [The folklore version of the fundamental question of
complexity theory] Why should the proof strategy be even theoretically
feasible, i.e., lead to a proof even theoretically? In other words, in what
sense is it fundamentally different from the trivial, infeasible strategy above
and not just a restatement of the original problem?
In general, what is a theoretically feasible proof strategy for the P vs.
NP problem? Does such a strategy even exist?
This question is natural and not new, because, in view of the univer-
sality of the P 6= NP conjecture, it has always been questioned right from
the beginning why it should even be provable. For example, why can it not
be independent of the formal axioms of mathematics? This was studied in
some early works; cf. [1] for their survey. It was also the motivation be-
hind identifying the fundamental local barriers towards this problem stated
above. These local barriers roughly say that the proof techniques akin to
the ones used for proving three types of lower bounds, namely the classi-
cal hierarchy theorems, lower bounds for constant depth circuits [10] and
the P 6= NC result without bit operations [GCTlocal], would not work
for the P vs. NP problem in a sense because the problem itself stands in
their way, along with its variants and properties, rendering them theoret-
ically infeasible, so to say. Admittedly, since these local barriers apply to
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proof techniques that constitute only very specific subareas of mathematics,
we cannot conclude anything about the proof techniques which go through
other areas of mathematics on the basis of such local barriers. But one can
still wonder if the P vs. NP problem could not stand in the way of every
proof technique like this, rendering it theoretically infeasible, and thereby
precluding its own proof. That is, what happened on the earlier three occa-
sions, why can it not keep on happening ad infinitum? This does not seem
inconceivable since the problem itself says that the discovery is hard, and
so, why could it not make the discovery of its own proof hard? Hence arises
the fundamental folklore question that has been lurking in the background
of the P vs. NP problem right from the beginning: why should a given
proof technique be even theoretically feasible as per some reasonable notion
of theoretical feasibility.
By the complexity barrier we mean the task of answering this Ques-
tion 2.1 formally. The key phrase here is formally. Because Question 2.1
itself is an informal folklore question with no theorem or precise mathematics
behind it. To answer it formally means:
1 Formalize the question: Fix a proof strategy and formalize the
question first by defining formally theoretically feasibility of this proof
strategy, justify why this is a reasonable formalization, and then
2 Answer it: Answer the formalized question, i.e., prove that the proof
strategy under consideration is theoretically feasible as per this formal
definition.
Here step 1 may be possible for only exceptional proof strategies. That is,
the P vs. NP problem seems so severe that it may not even allow most
proof strategies to define formally their own theoretical feasibility, let alone
prove themselves to be theoretically feasible and come near the problem.
Thus formalization of the folklore question as in step 1 is itself a part of
the challenge, a part of the root difficulty in approaching the P vs. NP
problem.
This is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, many fundamental questions in
science are informal folklore questions and a part or sometimes the whole of
the challenge lies in just formalizing them. For example:
Question 2.2 [The folklore version of the fundamental question of
computability theory]
What is computable (decidable)?
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This is informal. But the main challenge in computability theory as we
know now–we shall call this the computability barrier–was to formalize this
question by giving a precise mathematical meaning to the phrase computable
(Computability Hypothesis proposed by Church and Turing in [13, 56]) and
then justify that it is a reasonable formalization. Of course, formalization of
the phrase computable that we have today is one reasonable formalization–
we shall also call it a formalization of the computability barrier in the form
of a computability theory. Or, we will say that the present computability
theory is one way of formalizing the computability barrier or one formal ap-
proach to cross the computability barrier. We cannot say that it is the only
one. There may be other ways of reasonably formalizing Question 2.2. Ev-
ery such way will correspond to a different computability theory. But there
is just one computability theory today that has been universally accepted
as reasonable.
The formalization of this computability barrier is the key ingradient in
proving the fundamental Incompleteness Theorem of logic proved by Go¨del
[21]–namely, that the language of true statements in number theory is un-
decidable. Actually, the Incompleteness Theorem predated computability
theory and was originally stated in terms of definability rather than com-
putability. But let us imagine asking if number theory is decidable, without
even having a formal definition of decidable. (In fact, this is essentially what
happenned in Entscheidungsproblem posed by Hilbert [23] which asked if
number theory is decidable mechanically–and this was just taken as a folk-
lore notion.) Then the fundamental difficulty in answering this question is
just formalizing the informal Question 2.2. That is, formalization of the
computability barrier above. Once this is done and the phrase computable
or decidable is given a formal meaning, it becomes possible to prove the
Incompleteness Theorem by encoding computations. The Incompleteness
Theorem is also a universal statement about mathematics like the P vs.
NP problem. Hence, it is especially relevant to study the nature of the
fundamental conceptual difficulty in its proof. As we see in retrospect, this
was basically formalizing the fundamental folklore Question 2.2. If so, it
should not be surprising if at least a part of the fundamental conceptual dif-
ficulty in the proof of the other universal statement about mathematics–the
P vs. NP problem–should also be just formalizing some other fundamental
folklore question.
Question 2.1 seems to be that question. As per the folklore, it is supposed
to be the root difficulty of the P vs. NP problem, and a part of this difficulty
is just formally stating what the question is saying, i.e, formalizing this
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question by giving a precise mathematical meaning to theoretically feasibility
of a judiciously chosen proof strategy. If by complexity theory (of lower
bounds) we mean a theory for approaching the P vs. NP and related
problems, then there are as many complexity theories as there are ways of
formalizing this question reasonably, because each such formalization chalks
out a way of crossing the complexity barrier. GCT is one such way. But there
is one fundamental difference between computability theory and complexity
theory. We do not really expect many computability theories–i.e. ways of
crossing the computability barrier–whereas we do expect many complexity
theories–i.e. ways of crossing the complexity barrier.
Now we have to explain what we mean by a reasonable formalization of
Question 2.1. We mean that it should be in the spirit of the reasonable for-
malization of Question 2.2 in [13, 56]. Thus it should be absolutely precise
and formal as in these articles, and the interpretation of the phrase theo-
retically feasible should be reasonable like the interpretation of the phrase
computable as in these articles. Specifically, we mean:
I Give a mathematically precise formulation of an Obstruction Hypoth-
esis (OH) that is meant to be an alternative to IOH. Here it must
be proved unconditionally that OH implies IOH. Furthermore, this
obstruction hypothesis should be of the form:
(OH) : ∀n∀m = poly(n) : s(n,m),
where s(n,m) is some formal mathematical statement. The statement
s(n,m) is supposed to say that when m = poly(n) there exists some
cause of hardness (which we shall call an obstruction) because of which
IOH holds. We put no restriction on the nature of this cause. The
cause could be existence of some mathematical object in the spirit
of a trivial obstruction, in which case this object can be called an
obstruction–an alternative to a trivial obstruction. But this is not
necessary. The cause could be just some mathematical condition. As
long as it can be completely formalized in the form of a precise math-
ematical statement s(m,n) and OH implies IOH unconditionally, we
do not care. We call OH a complexity theoretic hypothesis because it
is necessary that m be small in comparison to n for it to hold.
II State precise formal mathematical hypotheses MH1, MH2, ... , MHr,
r ≥ 1, and give a mathematically precise formal and reasonable defini-
tion of the phrase theoretical feasibility (of OH) such that if MH1,...,MHr
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hold then OH becomes theoretically feasible as per this definition.
Here theoretical feasibility of OH is supposed to mean that once MH1,
..., MHr are proved the P 6= NP conjecture is not expected to stand
in the way of proving OH thereafter. Each mathematical hypothesis
should be of the form
(MHi) :∀n∀mti(m,n),
for some formal mathematical statements ti(m,n). We are calling it
mathematical because this is supposed to hold for all n andm, not just
when m = poly(n) or small as in the case of the complexity theoretic
IOH or OH. In other words, smallness of m with respect to n, the com-
plexity theoretic crux of the lower bound problem under consideration,
is supposed to be absent in the mathematical hypotheses.
III (a) Give reasonable justification for why OH should hold assuming
IOH (which we take on faith as true) or some reasonable stronger
forms of IOH. This is certainly a circular argument. Its only function
here is to give us reasonable confidence that OH is actually true, i.e.,
there is no loss of truth in going from IOH to OH.
(b) Give reasonable justification for why MH1,...,MHr should hold.
(c) Give reasonable justification for why the P 6= NP conjecture or
some equally hard or harder complexity theoretic hypotheses should
not stand in the way of proving MH1,..., MHr and in the way of proving
OH once MH1,..., MHk are proved. In other words, all these hypothe-
ses should only involve “easy” complexity theoretic hypotheses, where
by “easy” we mean the P 6= NP conjecture or its equivalent or harder
variants are not expected to stand in the way of their proofs.
At least one intuitive reason for why the P 6= NP conjecture should
not stand in the way of proving the mathematical hypotheses is already
there: namely, smallness of m with respect n, the complexity theoretic
crux of this conjecture, is absent in these hypotheses. But just this
is not enough. It is also necessary to give additional justifications as
to why some hard complexity theoretic hypotheses are not hidden or
encoded within these mathematical hypotheses or OH in some hard to
recognize forms.
Remark: In steps I,II, and III above we can substitute the usual uniform
version of the P 6= NP conjecture in place of IOH. That is, we do not really
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require here that the approach has try to prove the stronger nonuniform
version of the P 6= NP conjecture. The usual uniform version will do.
Once steps I to III are carried out the “hard” (i.e. theoretically infea-
sible) complexity theoretic hypothesis IOH is transformed into complexity
theoretic hypothesis OH which becomes “easy” (i.e. theoretically feasible)
once the mathematical hypotheses MH1,...,MHk are proved, and these math-
ematical hypotheses too involve only “easy” complexity theoretic hypothe-
ses, such that the P 6= NP conjecture is not expected to stand in the way
of the proofs of any of these “easy” complexity theoretic hypotheses. Thus
once Question 2.1 is fully formalized in this fashion, hard complexity theory
(IOH) is exchanged with hard mathematics (MH1,...,MHr + OH). What is
gained in this exchange is that the P 6= NP conjecture is not expected to
stand in the way doing this hard mathematics, and thus a fully formalized
mathematical program towards proving this conjecture is chalked out. We
say that the complexity barrier is formalized (in this approach) once steps I
to III are carried out and thus the folklore Question 2.1 is formalized.
We say that the complexity barrier is crossed (in this approach) and that
OH is theoretically feasible once MH1,...,MHr are proved–we also say that
the proof strategy (approach) becomes theoretically feasible. Theoretical
feasibility of the proof strategy does not automatically guarantee practical
feasibility of proving OH. That is, even after OH has been proved to be
theoretically feasible actually proving it may be a mathematical challenge,
though it is a formally “easy” complexity theoretic hypothesis then. This is
why we regarded OH as hard mathematics above.
Now arises the next question: what is meant by reasonable justifications
in III? Certainly we cannot expect a proof technique to formally prove that
the P 6= NP conjecture or its harder variants would not stand in the way of
proving MH1,...,MHr and OH, because the only way to prove this formally
is to actually prove them unconditionally thereby proving the P 6= NP
conjecture itself. But this is a serious issue because regardless of how rea-
sonable the justifications of a proof technique may look at the surface, what
is the guarantee that the P 6= NP conjecture or some equivalent or harder
complexity theoretic assumptions, such as existence of one way functions,
pseudorandom generators etc. as per the hardness vs. randomness princi-
ple [53], are not lying hidden within MH1,...,MHr and OH in some hard to
recognize forms? That is, what is the guarantee that the proof technique
is not simply restating the problem in an equivalent terms with an inge-
nious encoding and thus going in circles, or worse, making it harder and
thus going backwards, thereby simply evading Question 2.1 despite all this
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formalization?
To see the seriousness of this issue, let us imagine ourselves in the early
seventies, before the work on pseudo-random generators, derandomization,
one-way functions and so forth began, and imagine that some proof tech-
nique came along claiming to be an approach to the NEXP vs. P/poly
problem–which is far, far weaker than the P vs. NP problem, but let us
ignore that–by reducing this problem to the problem of showing that polyno-
mial identity testing belongs to P and then claiming to be theoretically fea-
sible because the latter is an upper bound problem involving P which stands
for theoretically feasible. At that time this may have seemed like a reason-
able justification. After all, if a proof technique has reduced a lower bound
problem to an upper bound problem over P , then it seems like progress, at
least, at the surface. Coming to back to the present, we know now, thanks
to all the work on the hardness vs. randomness principle [27, 53, 24] that
has happenned in the meanwhile, that the proof technique was just going
in circles. Because polynomial identity testing belongs to BPP and as per
[24] derandomization of polynomial identity testing essentially amounts to
proving the original lower bound problem or worse the harder permanent vs.
determinant problem. In other words, the hardness vs. randomness prin-
ciple tells us today that all arguments which look like reductions to upper
bound problems at the surface but involve pseudorandom generators, one
way functions, derandomizations, and so forth are circular, something that
we may not have seen so clearly in the seventies.
Indeed, one significant outcome of the works on NP -completeness [14,
29, 33], plausible formal independence of the P vs. NP problem (surveyed
in [1]), the local barriers [7, 55, 36, 2], and the hardness vs. randomness prin-
ciple [27, 53, 24] in the last few decades was the discovery of the formidable
circle around the P vs. NP problem. That is, they together raised Ques-
tion 2.1 and pointed out the extreme difficulty of penetrating this circle.
Which is why, though we cannot ask for a complete guarantee that the
P 6= NP conjecture or its variants would not stand in the way of proving
MH1,...MHr, and OH, because that only comes after proving P 6= NP , we
need at least some reasonably hard guarantee that the proof technique has
indeed penetrated this circle.
To see how to get such a hard guarantee, let us closely compare the circle
around the P vs. NP problem with the one around the Incompleteness
Theorem and then try to transfer what we already know about how the
circle around the latter was penetrated to get an idea about how the proof
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technique that penetrates the circle around the former ought to be. There is
a circle around the Incompleteness Theorem because when it says there exist
unprovable statements in mathematics or that the truth in number theory is
undecidable it seems as if it is also hinting that it may be unprovable itself
or that its truth may be undecidable. There is a circle around the P vs.
NP problem, because when it says that discovery is hard it seems as if it
is also hinting that the discovery of its own proof may be hard. Any proof
strategy for the Incompleteness Theorem or the P vs. NP problem has to
break this self-referential paradox–the circle. The conceptual breakthrough
in [21] was to break this circle for the Incompleteness Theorem and show
that it is talking about the rest of mathematics not itself. If we closely
examine the proof strategy in [21], we see that it is extremely rigid. By this
we mean that we know just one way of penetrating this circle today, and
though there are many versions and proofs of the Incompleteness theorem,
all of them essentially use the same basic idea. Similarly, the formalization
of the the computability barrier in [13, 56]–the key ingradient in proving the
Incompleteness Theorem–is also extremely rigid. By this, we mean we know
just one reasonable formalization of the computability barrier today. So far,
we do not know any other formalization that is “more or less reasonable”,
“close to reasonable” or “almost reasonable”. In short, it is a 0-1 game:
it either works completely or fails completely. We expect this 0-1 game to
continue in the P vs. NP problem as well.
This 0-1 game cannot be formalized. But we can state a certain Rigidity
Hypothesis formally which intuitively suggests this 0-1 game for the com-
plexity barrier as well. Towards that end, let us assume that the proof
technique has provided as in the the natural proof paper [55] a formal state-
ment of a Useful Property (UPn), which lies at its heart, and assuming which
it plans to prove P 6= NP . Formally, UPn is a subset of the set of all n-ary
boolean functions. Its definition is as in [55] and we do not restate it here.
Let N = 2n be the truth table size of specifying any n-ary boolean function.
Definition 2.3 We say that a proof technique is
1. Nonrigid if |UPn| ≥ 2
N/N c, for some constant c > 0,
2. Mildly rigid if |UPn| ≤ 2
N/N c for every constant c > 0, as n → ∞,
or more strongly, |UPn| ≤ 2
N/2n
a
, for some constant a ≥ 1,
3. Rigid if |UPn| ≤ 2
ǫN , for some 0 ≤ ǫ < 1,
4. Strongly rigid if |UPn| ≤ 2
Nǫ , for some 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, and
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5. Extremely rigid if |UPn| ≤ 2
poly(n), i.e., ≤ 2n
a
for some constant
a > 0.
Thus probabilistic proof techniques to which the natural proof barrier
[55] applies are nonrigid, and if a proof technique is mildly rigid it bypasses
this barrier, since it violates the largeness criterion in [55].
Hypothesis 2.4 (Rigidity Hypothesis (RH)) Any eventual proof (tech-
nique) that shows P 6= NP is extremely rigid.
The natural proof paper says that any eventual proof of the P 6= NP
conjecture is mildly rigid (assuming some hardness assumptions and an ad-
ditional constructivity criterion). The Rigidity Hypothesis says that the
reality is extremely severe compared to this. Its detailed discussion with
motivations etc. will appear in GCTflip.
Computability Hypothesis [13, 56] says that there is essentially just one
reasonable way to formalize the computability barrier and that way–i.e., the
specific notion of computability that we have today–is extremely rigid as ex-
plained above. In the case of the complexity barrier there need not be just
one way to formalize it. The Rigidity Hypothesis suggests that that each
way may be extremely rigid again–i.e., the notion “a theoretically feasible
proof technique” may also be an extremely rigid notion like “computable”.
Unfortunately, we cannot formally define extreme rigidity of a notion. The
Rigidity Hypothesis is the best that we can do formally. It is talking about
extreme rigidity of a proof, but that may be taken as suggesting extreme
rigidity of the notion of “a theoretically feasible proof technique”, i.e., ex-
treme rigidity of formalizing the complexity barrier as in the case of the
computability barrier. Intuitively, this suggests that a formalization of the
complexity barrier may be either completely right or completely wrong like
in the case of the computability barrier. Which is why if a formalization is
reasonable and extremely rigid, then intuitively we expect only two possi-
bilities: either it is really an approach to the P vs. NP problem or just a
circular restatement, and we have to distinguish between the two. For this,
all we have to do is to insist that some restricted form of the proof strategy
also yield an unconditional lower bound that is nontrivial enough so that if
the proof strategy were circular it will simply not be able to provide such a
lower bound, and furthermore, we also insist that the proof strategy should
provide evidence that it bypasses the earlier known local barriers. If it does
this, then assuming that it is a 0-1 game, there is a reasonable assurance
that the formalization is indeed an approach to the P vs. NP problem.
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With this in mind, we will say that a proof strategy is a formal approach
towards the P vs. NP problem if it meets the following criteria:
A Some weaker form of the proof strategy yields a concrete unconditional
superpolynomial lower bound that is a restricted form and a formal
implication of any of the fundamental separation problems in Figure 1
(the center of complexity theory) in a realistic and natural model of
computation, where by natural and realistic we mean a model that is
actually used extensively in practice and is not defined for the sake of
proving the lower bound.
B The proof strategy provides evidence that it bypasses the earlier known
local barriers mentioned before simultaneously. Here, in view of the
fundamental nature of these barriers and given that they were pro-
posed and accepted in the field as metabarriers, we agree to take them
in the meta sense–i.e., in spirit rather than letter. Because formally
the natural proof barrier [55] is defined only for the unrestricted P
vs. NP problem and is crossed only after proving P 6= NP , which
is of no help in evaluating any proof strategy. Fortunately, this and
other local barriers make sense in spirit in any reasonable restricted
setting. Thus we will say that a proof technique bypasses the natu-
ral proof barrier [55] if it does not apply to most functions, with the
meaning of most like in [55] (this makes sense over the boolean field as
well as over Q as long as we take bitlengths of rational numbers into
account in a natural way, and if a restricted model is natural enough–
which we require–it should come with a natural meaning for most).
We will say that it bypasses the relativization barrier [7] if it is alge-
braic, i.e., works on algebrized forms of computations in the spirit of
the IP = PSPACE result. We will say that it bypasses the algebraic
degree barrier [GCTlocal] if it does not use low degree techniques.
C It provides a reasonable formalization of Question 2.1 by carrying out
steps I,II and III above.
D (Extreme Rigidity): It formally states the UP for the P vs. NP
problem and proves its extreme rigidity. It should be clear that this
UP lies at the heart of the approach.
We shall refer to these as the criteria A,B, C, and D to determine if a
proof strategy is a formal approach.
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All approaches can agree on A and B given that the fundamental dif-
ficulty of proving any natural and realistic superpolynomial lower bound
implication of any of the fundamental separation problems in Figure 1 and
of crossing the earlier local barriers simultaneously has been well recognized
by now. An approach which is just restating the P vs. NP or related
problem, such as the hypothetical proof strategy in the seventies above, by
hiding the original lower bound problem or its equivalent or harder forms
in any of its hypotheses will not be able to meet criteria A and B. Hence if
an approach can meet the criteria A and B, this provides a reasonable hard
guarantee that it is not restating the original problem and going in circles,
which is what crossing the complexity barrier finally means: overcoming the
seemingly self-referential nature of the P vs. NP problem. Similarly, all
approaches can agree on C given that it has been accepted in the folklore
that Question 2.1 is the root difficulty of the P vs. NP problem and that
any approach would have to finally answer it in one way or the other. But if
a proof technique cannot even formally state the question that it is trying to
answer how can we call it an approach? Motivation behind D is the Rigidity
Hypothesis stated above.
Once A, B, C, D are met, the proof technique has chalked out a complete
mathematical program C towards the P vs. NP problem in the form of the
hypotheses MH1,...,MHr and OH, provided reasonable justification that the
P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of proving MH1,...,MHr
and hence OH, and has provided a reasonable hard guarantee in the form of
the criteria A and B that this path is actually going forwards, not in circles,
or even worse, backwards, and has shown that the program is extremely
rigid. It is then reasonable to call it a formal approach to the P vs. NP
problem in view of the Rigidity Hypothesis and the remarks before and after
that hypothesis above.
By a complexity theory of the P vs. NP problem we mean a mathemat-
ical theory of any formal approach towards this problem. Just as we have
as many computability theories as there are formal approaches to cross the
computability barrier, there are as many complexity theories of the P vs.
NP problem as there are formal approaches to cross the complexity bar-
rier. But unlike in the case of the computability theory, we expect many
complexity theories–though as we have already said, the P 6= NP conjecture
seems so severe that each such complexity theory may have to be exceptional
(like the present computability theory) because otherwise formalization of
the complexity barrier may simply be impossible (as in the case of the com-
putability barrier).
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The complexity barrier can also be defined for other problems related to
the P vs. NP problem, such as the P vs. NC or #P vs. NC problems.
Formal approaches and complexity theories associated with these problems
are defined similarly.
It may be noticed that the meaning of the phrase barrier in complexity
barrier is different from its meaning in the local barriers such as the algebraic
degree barrier. The algebraic degree barrier has a a precise and formal
mathematical definition, cf. Chapter 7 in GCTlocal. In contrast, formalizing
the complexity barrier is in fact a part of that barrier. The complexity
barrier is a barrier in the same sense that the computability barrier is a
barrier. There is no computability theory until the computability barrier is
formalized. Similarly, if we accept that Question 2.1 is the root difficulty
of the P vs. NP problem, then there is no complexity theory of the P vs.
NP problem in a formal sense until the complexity barrier is formalized.
In that sense we may say that the complexity barrier is the main barrier
of complexity theory. Whereas the algebraic degree barrier is more like a
guiding post. As long as we keep in mind that universal and local barriers
are of a different kind, there should be no confusion.
3 The main result of GCT
The main result of GCT is that it is a formal approach towards the P
vs. NP and related problems that meets the criteria A,B, C, and D. This
then yields one formal complexity theory of the P vs. NP problem. The
P 6= NC result without bit operations [GCTlocal] meets criterion A as
explained in Section 6. The mathematical form of the #P 6= NC conjecture
in characteristic zero [GCT1,2,6] meets criterion B as explained in Section 8.
The main result of GCT6 gives a reasonable formalization of the complexity
barrier; i.e., reasonable formalization of Question 2.1; cf. Sections 10-12.
This meets criterion C. Criterion D for the permanent vs. determinant
problem is addressed in Section 7 and for the P vs. NP problem in GCTflip.
We have already remarked that the complexity barrier plays the same
role in the context of the P vs. NP problem that the computability barrier
plays in the context of the Incompleteness Theorem. GCT6 formalizes the
complexity barrier in the same spirit that the articles [13, 56] formalize the
computability barrier. Hence it is illuminating to compare the formalization
of the computability barrier in [13, 56] with the formalization of the com-
plexity barrier in GCT6. The formalization of Question 2.2 in [13, 56] is
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mathematically elementary (though conceptually a breakthrough) whereas
the formalization of Question 2.1 in GCT6 is mathematically nonelementary,
because it crucially depends on fundamental results and constructions in al-
gebraic geometry and representation theory. At present, we do not know any
elementary way of formalizing Question 2.1 reasonably. Once Question 2.2
is formalized, the proof of the Incompleteness theorem in [21] (or rather its
translation by substituting computability for definability) is also mathemat-
ically elementary (though conceptually a breakthrough again). In contrast,
the plan for answering the formalization of Question 2.1 in [GCT6,7,8,11]
goes through the theory of nonstandard quantum groups and seems to need
nontrivial extension of the work surrounding the profound positivity result
of mathematics–the Riemann hypothesis over finite fields [16].
This suggests that there is a massive gap in the difficulty of the Incom-
pleteness Theorem and the P vs. NP problem. That there should be a
gap should not be surprising. The former is a universal statement about
the idealized world of mathematics wherein the computational complexity
measures–time and space–do not matter, whereas the latter is a univer-
sal statement about the far more complex physical world of mathematics
wherein time and space do matter. But what may be surprising perhaps is
the massive scale of the gap.
One may ask if this massive gap between the two universal statements
about mathematics is intrinsic, or if there is an easier elementary formal
approach to the P vs. NP problem wherein the gap is not so huge. Well,
at present we are not aware of any unconditional lower bounds in com-
plexity theory that meet the criteria A and/or B other than the ones in
GCT mentioned above. The proof of the first lower bound of GCT needs
classical algebraic geometry, whereas that of the second geometric invariant
theory[52]. Furthermore, as we mentioned above, the formalization in GCT6
of Question 2.1–the root difficulty of the P vs. NP problem– also needs al-
gebraic geometry and representation theory. That is, at present, we cannot
even state formally in an elementary language what Question 2.1 is saying
let alone set up some elementary program for answering it. Furthermore,
universality means that the basic structure of all the approaches towards
the P vs. NP problem should be the same, just as the basic structure of
all the proofs of the Incompleteness Theorem and related results known so
far is the same. Thus it seems that the P vs. NP problem may be a diffi-
cult problem after all that needs nonelementary techniques for any realistic
chance of progress despite its deceptively elementary statement.
The rest of this article gives an overview of how GCT meets the criteria
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A, B, C, and D. The formalization of the complexity barrier is done in steps.
In Section 4, we define abstract nonuniform approaches towards the P vs.
NP problem. Here abstract means not formal. So an abstract approach is
a high level scheme for an approach. In Section 5, we restrict an abstract
nonuniform approach to what we call an (abstract) flip, which is the defining
abstract strategy of GCT. A local form of the abstract flip is implemented
in a restricted setting in the form of the first lower bound in Section 6. The
abstract flip is implemented in a restricted setting in the form of the second
lower bound in Section 8. Sections 10 and 12 give a high level overview of
a formalization of the abstract flip (formal flip) in the unrestricted setting,
i.e., formalization of Question 2.1. A full description of this formalization
(in characteristic zero) can be found in the mathematical overview [40]; for
the full formalization (for fields of positive characteristic, including the finite
boolean field as in the usual case) see GCT6.
4 Nonuniform approaches
In the rest of this paper we confine our attention to nonuniform approaches
unlike the uniform approaches used to prove the classical hierarchy theo-
rems, since the relativization barrier [7] suggests such approaches have a
fundamental limitation in the context of the P vs. NP problem. If there
exists a nonrelativizable uniform approach, we leave the task of formaliz-
ing the complexity barrier to that approach. In this section we define an
abstract nonuniform approach to the nonuniform P vs. NP problem in Sec-
tion 2. Recall that the problem is to show nonexistence of small circuits for
computing f(X) = f(x1, . . . , xn) as there.
By a nonuniform approach we mean it shows existence of some ob-
struction On,m (proof-certificate of hardness as per that approach in the
spirit of the trivial obstruction but better) depending on n for every n and
m = poly(n). All proofs of nonuniform lower bounds so far, e.g. [10, 54, 36],
prove existence of such obstructions that are better than the trivial obstruc-
tions in the lower bound problems under consideration. For example, in the
proof of the lower bound for constant depth circuits an obstruction is a table
that lists for every constant depth small size circuit a counter example that
could be potentially produced by the derandomized polynomial time ver-
sion [4] of the random restriction procedure [10]. This obstruction is better
than the brute force trivial obstruction in the sense that its each row can be
constructed in polynomial time instead of exponential time as in the brute
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force method.
Formally:
Definition 4.1 We say that a family O = ∪n,mOn,m of mathematical ob-
jects is an obstruction family to efficient computation of f(X) = f(x1, . . . , xn)
if
1. Each object O in O called an obstruction has a specification (a bit
string) denoted by [O]. An object On,m ∈ On,m is called an obstruction
to computation of f(X) by circuits of size m.
2. Nonemptyness of On,m, i.e., existence of an obstruction On,m serves
as a guarantee that f(X) cannot be computed by circuits of size m.
Specifically, there is a decidable decoding algorithm that given n,m
and the specification [O] = [On,m] of an obstruction O = On,m ∈ On,m
produces a trivial obstruction to computation of f(X) by circuits of
size m, i.e., a table that gives for each circuit C of size m a counter
example X so that fC(X) 6= f(X). This decoding algorithm must
be guaranteed to be correct. That is, it must produce such a trivial
obstruction correctly for every obstruction. But we put no restriction
on the computational complexity of the algorithm.
Given an obstruction O ∈ O, we let 〈O〉 denote the bitlength of its descrip-
tion [O]. We say that an obstruction family is uniform if 〈O〉 is O(1) for
every obstruction O.
In principle, we do not need a decoding algorithm here. All we need
is a guarantee than nonemptyness of On,m implies that f(X) cannot be
computed by circuits of size m. But decoding algorithm makes everything
concrete, so we will assume that it is there.
The most important obstruction is a final proof of the P 6= NP conjec-
ture. It has O(1) length and can be verified in O(1) time. We call it the
final obstruction. For this obstruction there is a trivial decoding algorithm,
namely, for each circuit C of size m = poly(n), just compute fC and f on
all X of length n in any order and produce the first X on which they differ.
A final proof of the P 6= NP conjecture guarantees that this algorithm is
correct, but it is not until then. Once there is a final proof, an O(1)-size pro-
gram for f(X), or for that matter any NP-complete function, also becomes
an obstruction with a trivial decoding algorithm, but not until then. Other
well known O(1)-size obstructions in the P vs. NP problem are polynomial
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time one way functions or pseudo random generators. But the problem of
proving existence of such obstructions is believed to be even harder than the
P vs. NP problem. Alternatively, we can consider an O(1)-size program
for an explicitly given conjectural one way function or pseudo random gen-
erator. This is an obstruction only after it is proved that the function under
consideration is indeed a one-way function or a pseudo random generator,
but proving that is again believed to be harder than the original P vs. NP
problem. Thus it can be seen that any argument based on such uniform, i.e.,
O(1)-size objects is bound to be circular, which is what has to be avoided
to cross the complexity barrier, and furthermore, the relativization barrier
[7] also suggests that arguments based on uniform objects may have fun-
damental limitations. Hence, our interest is primarily in the intermediate
obstructions that are meant to be a vehicle in a given nonuniform approach
to reach a final proof (i.e. a final obstruction) in the spirit of the intermedi-
ate obstructions that are used to prove the earlier nonuniform lower bound
results [10, 54, 36]. Hence, whenever we say obstructions we have in mind
intermediate nonuniform obstructions which lie on the way from the trivial
to the final obstruction.
5 The flip: going for explicit construction
We now define the abstract defining strategy of GCT, called the flip [GCT6,GCTflip],
for formalizing and crossing the complexity barrier. It is the most obvious
and natural nonuniform strategy for this suggested by the P vs. NP prob-
lem itself.
Before we define it, let us first see what is wrong with the trivial obstruc-
tion from the complexity-theoretic point of view (cf. Figure 3). That is quite
clear. First, it is long, i.e., its description takes exponential space. Second,
it is hard to verify (and also construct); i.e., this takes exponential time.
Since NP is the class of problems with “proof-certificates” that are short
of polynomial-size and easy to verify in polynomial-time, this then leads to
the following flip strategy for proving the nonuniform P 6= NP conjecture,
with the obvious complexity-theoretic interpretation of the phrase theoreti-
cally feasible. (We treat formalization and crossing of the complexity barrier
simultaneously below, instead of separately as we did in Section 2).
I. (The flip: theoretical feasibility of verification) :
(a) Formulate a new notion of a (nonuniform) obstruction (cf. Definition 4.1)
that is explicit, by which we mean short and easy-to-verify. Formally:
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Figure 3: From trivial to new obstruction
Definition 5.1 We say that an obstruction family O (Definition 4.1) is
explicit if:
1. Shortness: For any n and m < 2n, if there exists an obstruction in
On,m to efficient computation of f(X) by circuits of size m, then there
also exists a short obstruction On,m in On,m, where by short we mean
the bitlength 〈On,m〉 of its specification is poly(n) (note the bound does
not depend on m).
2. Easy-to-verify: Given n in unary, m in binary and a bit string x,
whether it is the specification [On,m] of an obstruction On,m ∈ On,m
can be decided in poly(n, 〈x〉) time, where 〈x〉 denotes the bitlength of
x (note the bound again does not depend on m).
This means that the problem of verifying (recognizing) an obstruction
(or rather its specification) belongs to P , and hence, is theoretically feasible
(“easy”). Thus this notion of an obstruction is then fundamentally better
than the theoretically infeasible trivial obstruction as far as verification is
concerned.
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Now, to prove P 6= NP it suffices to show that On,m is nonempty if
m = poly(n), n→∞. In this step, the approach should also justify on the
basis of mathematical evidence why this should be so assuming P 6= NP
(nonuniform). This circular reasoning at this stage is only meant to convince
us before we plunge ahead that such obstructions should exist, i.e., there is
no loss of essential information, assuming P 6= NP , which we take on faith,
and the goal now is to prove the existence of these obstructions.
(b) Also state precise formal mathematical hypotheses MH1, ..., MHs as-
suming which the problem for verifying obstructions belongs to P . (Here
the meaning of a mathematical hypothesis is as in Section 2). Also justify
(as in the step II of Section 2) why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand
in the way of proving these mathematical hypotheses.
By a reasonable formalization of this step I of the flip, we mean precise
mathematical formulation of MH1, ..., MHs, with a reasonable justification
for why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of their proofs.
By implementation of this step I, we mean formally proving MH1, ..., MHs
and thereby proving that the problem of verifying obstructions belongs to
P .
Intuitively (cf. Figure 3), we can think of the new explicit obstruction
as an encryption of a some trivial obstruction of exponential size which
is highly compressible in the information theoretic sense–i.e., such that its
description can be encrypted in polynomial size–and furthermore, such that
the encrypted information can also be verified fast in polynomial time. At
the surface, it is hard to believe that such an obstruction can even exist. To
see why, let us note that to verify if f(X) = fC(X), we have to evaluate
fC(X), cannot be done in polynomial time, i.e., in n
a time for some fixed a >
0, if the sizem of C is superpolynomial (say nlogn) or alternatively, ifm = nb
where b is much larger than a. In other words, if a is fixed and we want to
evaluate circuits of polynomial size of nonfixed degree we are in trouble and
even one row of a trivial obstruction cannot be evaluated in na time for any
fixed a To verify the new obstruction, in effect, we are implicitly verifying
all exponentially many rows of some trivial obstruction in O(na) time for
some fixed a, but without even knowing what that trivial obstruction is,
since the verification procedure cannot afford to decrypt the new obstruction
using the associated decoding procedure to get an exponential size trivial
obstruction. This may seem impossible at the surface. In fact, this may
seem impossible even if we were to allow ourselves poly(m) time, because
verification of a trivial obstruction given in the form of an oracle–let us call
it O–is a ΠO2 -problem, which we do not expect to belong to P if P 6= NP .
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Thus it may seem that such a scheme could not possibly exist and that the
P 6= NP conjecture would again stand in the way of this verification either
directly or indirectly (implicitly). Formalization of this step of the flip–i.e.
formulation of MH1, ..., MHs with a reasonable justification for why the
P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of their proofs–amounts
to justifying why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way
of verifying the new obstruction–which is what formalizing the complexity
barrier essentially means here.
Of course, the actual implementation does not have to encrypt any trivial
obstructions. The new obstruction could be such that its existence implies
existence of some trivial obstruction in a highly indirect way. That is, the
computational complexity of the associated decoding algorithm (which we
are only assuming is decidable) could be extremely high. And for that mat-
ter, we do not even need such a decoding algorithm as long as there is
a guarantee that existence of an obstruction implies existence of a trivial
obstruction. But if it is possible to get a trivial obstruction from a new
obstruction easily; i.e., if the associated decoding algorithm works in poly-
nomial time, by which we mean given specification of a new obstruction
On,m and a small C of size m it produces in poly(n,m, 〈On,m〉) time a coun-
terexample X for C–then we say that the new obstruction is easy to decode.
Note that if On,m is short, i.e., 〈On,m〉 = poly(n), then this running time
is poly(n,m). Though we do not need the decoding algorithm to work in
polynomial time, at least at this stage, it may intuitively help to imagine
that the new obstructions are easy to decode.
It may be noticed that a final proof of the P 6= NP conjecture is an
explicit obstruction for every n and m = poly(n) as per Definition 5.1 since
it can be verified in O(1) time. That is how it ought to be since a final
proof is the most explicit obstruction to the equality of NP with P that one
can imagine. Similarly, an O(1)-size program for a one way function is an
explicit obstruction for every n and m = poly(n) after there is a final proof
that it is indeed a one way function, i.e., when it is accompanied by such a
final proof (without it it is not even an obstruction, as already pointed out).
But we are assuming here that the approach has not been so lucky as to
come with a final proof right in the first step. That is, the new obstruction
in this first step is not a final proof or accompanied by a final proof but only
a vehicle towards the final proof as in the proofs of the earlier nonuniform
lower bounds.
II. (The strong flip: theoretical feasibility of discovery) [optional]:
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(a) Give a poly(n) time algorithm for deciding, for any given n and m < 2n,
if there exists such a new obstruction, and constructing the specification
of one if one exists. This means the problem of discovering an obstruction
belongs to P , and hence, is theoretically feasible (“easy”). Formally,
Definition 5.2 We say that an explicit family of obstructions (Definition 5.1)
is strongly explicit if there is a discovery algorithm that given any n and
m < 2n decides in poly(n) time if On,m is nonempty and, if so, produces in
this much time specification [On,m] of an obstruction On,m ∈ On,m. (Note
independence of the running time from m.)
We say that a strongly explicit family is extremely explicit if, in addition,
the obstructions are easy to decode; i.e., given the specification of a new
obstruction On,m ∈ On,m and a small C of size m the associated decoding
algorithm produces in poly(n,m, 〈On,m〉) time a counterexample X for C.
Strong explicitness means that the problem of discovering an obstruction
(or rather its specification) belongs to P , and hence, is theoretically feasible
(“easy”).
(b) Also state precise formal mathematical hypotheses MHs+1, ..., MHr
(in addition to the hypotheses MH1,... , MHs in the first step) assuming
which the problem for discovering obstructions belongs to P and justify
why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of proving these
mathematical hypotheses.
By a reasonable formalization of this step II of the flip, we mean precise
mathematical formulation of MHs+1, ..., MHr, with a reasonable justifi-
cation for why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of
their proofs. By implementation of this step II, we mean formally proving
MHs+1, ..., MHr (in addition to MH1, ..., MHs in the step I) and thereby
proving that the problem of discovering obstructions belongs to P .
Again the P 6= NP conjecture seems to stand in the way of this step at
the surface, because the conjecture says discovery is hard, whereas this step
says discovery (of its own proof) is easy.
III. (Practical feasibility): Using the “easy” criterion for recognizing an
obstruction in step I, prove:
OH (Obstruction Hypothesis): If m = poly(n), then for every suffi-
ciently large n, there exists such a short obstruction On,m ∈ On,m.
If we also have an “easy” procedure for discovering an obstruction in
step II, then this amounts to proving that this procedure always discovers
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and constructs the specification of an obstruction On,m successfully when
m = poly(n)–i.e., the discovery procedure works correctly (successfully). So
this step amount to proving correctness of the discovery program.
Definition 5.3 We call a proof of the P 6= NP conjecture an explicit proof
based on the given notion of obstructions if it is based on the flip and carries
out (i.e. implements) step I, a strongly explicit proof if it carries out both
steps I and II, and an extremely explicit proof if in addition, the obstructions
are easy to decode.
Explicit and strongly explicit proofs based on proof-certificates that are
easy to verify and discover make sense in a large class of problems in math-
ematics, not just in complexity theory as here. See [GCTflip] for a detailed
discussion of explicit proofs in mathematics (they were referred to as P -
verifiable and P -constructible proofs in the earlier version of GCTflip). We
shall not worry about this wider issue here.
We say that the flip, and hence, the complexity barrier is (reasonably)
formalized once OH and MH1,..., MHr are formally stated with a reasonable
justification for why they should hold and why the P 6= NP conjecture
should not stand in the way of the proofs of MH1 to MHr. The justification
for why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of proving OH,
once MH1, ..., MHr are proved, is given below. We say that the complexity
barrier for verification is formalized once OH, MH1, ..., MHs are formally
stated with reasonable justification, and the complexity barrier for discovery
is formalized once, in addition, MHs+1, ..., MHr are formally stated with
reasonable justification.
We say that OH becomes theoretically feasible once the steps I and II
have been carried out (implemented)–and thus MH1, ..., MHr are proved–
since the associated problems of verifying and constructing an obstruction
then become theoretically feasible, i.e., belong to P–in other words, the the-
oretically infeasible task of proving IOH is transformed into a theoretically
feasible task of proving OH, and however hard the task of proving OH may
be mathematically, the P 6= NP conjecture can be expected not to stand
in the way of its proof. Hence, the name of this strategy the flip: from
the infeasible to the feasible. We also say that the complexity barrier for
verification is crossed once step I is carried out, and the complexity barrier
for discovery is crossed once step II is carried out, and the complexity bar-
rier is crossed once both steps I and II are carried out. We also say that
the approach becomes theoretically feasible once the complexity barrier is
crossed.
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Of course, theoretical feasibility of OH does not automatically imply
that the task of actually proving it would be practically feasible. For that,
it is also necessary that the algorithms for verifying and discovering an ob-
struction in steps I and II have a simple enough structure that can be used
for proving OH in step III; i.e., for proving correctness of the discovery pro-
cedure. If not, they have to made simpler and simpler until this becomes
practically feasible. Theoretical feasibility of the approach basically means
that the P 6= NP conjecture should no longer stand in the way of the
approach, and hence, there is no philosophical barrier to practical feasibil-
ity, though transforming a theoretically feasible approach into a practically
feasible approach can be a challenging mathematical problem in itself.
Step II above has been labelled optional, because there may exist a proof
of the P 6= NP conjecture along the lines of the flip that takes substantial
short cuts in this step. For example, a proof technique may simply be lucky
and come up with a right guess for the obstruction family (since it is meant
to be carried out by humans and not machines). But substantial short cuts
in step I seem difficult. After all, if the proof technique cannot even recognize
easily what it is searching for, then there seems to be a serious problem.
Here is another way to look at the flip (cf. Figure 4). For that let us
reexamine IOH. The problem of deciding, given X and C, if f(X) 6= fC(X)
belongs to PNP . Since there are two alternating layers of quantifiers in (1),
the problem of verifying it–i.e. the problem of deciding if a trivial obstruction
exists for given n and m specified in unary–belongs to ΠNP2 ⊆ Π3. We
refer to this as the decision problem associated with IOH and denote it by
DP (IOH). When m = poly(n), IOH is expected to be a tautology, though
we do not know that yet, and hence, the answer to this decision problem
would then be always yes. But for general m, not just m = poly(n), it
is a hard decision problem that lies high in the complexity hierarchy (cf.
Figure 4) and this is another reason for referring to IOH as theoretically
infeasible. Let DP (OH) be the decision problem associated with OH, by
which we mean the problem of deciding existence of a (new) obstruction
for given n in unary and m in binary (instead of in unary as above–which
makes the problem harder). It belongs to NP after execution of the step
I and to P after the step II. Once this P -verifiable OH is proved, it is
reduced to a tautology (FOH: Final Obstruction Hypothesis), which can
be verified in O(1) time. This gives us the final O(1)-size proof. Thus
the basic idea of the flip is to systematically eliminate the quantifiers in
IOH and reduce the complexity of the decision problem associated with the
obstruction hypothesis until the obstruction hypothesis is finally reduced to
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(The final O(1)−time verifiable proof)
The final obstruction hypothesis (FOH)
The class of 
O(1)−time verifiable
Tautologies
Infeasible Obstruction Hypothesis  (IOH):
The strong flip
The final elimination
of quantifier
The flip
DP(OH)
DP(OH)
DP(FOH)
DP(IOH)
Obstruction Hypothesis (OH):
Obstruction Hypothesis (OH):
(theoretically feasible verification)
(theoretically feasible discovery)PSfrag replacements
Π3
Π2
P
NP
T
DP (IOH) ∈ Π3
DP (OH) ∈ NP
DP (OH) ∈ P
Figure 4: The flip and the polynomial time hierarchy
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an O(1)-time verifiable tautology; cf. Figure 4.
But this extremely simple strategy is also deeply paradoxical. Because
it may be conjectured that DP (IOH) ∈ Π3 above is hard, i.e., does not
belong to Π2 or Σ2. Though this problem may not be Π3-complete, we can
still call it a universal problem, because the P vs. NP problem and hence
IOH is a universal statement about mathematics. So to make the flip work,
the approach has to come with a new notion of an obstruction so that for
m = poly(n) the new OH is equivalent to IOH logically (both becoming
tautologies), and yet the decision problem for the new OH for general m
should belong to NP for the flip and P for the strong flip. Furthermore, the
new OH is also a universal statement since it is meant to imply P 6= NP .
Assumming that the polynomial time hierarchy does not collapse, or more
specifically, that Π3 6= NP 6= P , such reduction of a universal statement in
Π3 to another in NP and then to P may seem impossible. That is, as the
flip starts moving from IOH towards its final destination FOH through the
polynomial time hierarchy as shown in Figure 4, it may seem as if it may
bring about a collapse of this hierarchy in its wake thereby disproving the
very conjectures it is meant to prove. So once again we see the self-referential
nature of the complexity barrier which is saying here that the main barrier
towards the P vs. NP problem is the problem itself.
For mathematical problems which are not universal, theoretical feasibil-
ity can be meaningless. For example, consider a trivial assertion ∀A,B :
A + B = B + A where A and B are n× n matrices. The problem of brute
force verification of this assertion belongs to Π1, but that is no indication of
its difficulty, and we cannot say that it is a theoretically infeasible hypoth-
esis. Indeed, it is well known in proof theory that the logical complexity of
an assertion, i.e., the number of alternating quantifiers in it, is in general
no index of its mathematical difficulty. In the context of the P vs. NP
problem theoretical feasibility of elimination of the quantifying variables in
IOH is a fundamental issue only because of its universality and because
those alternating quantifiers are intimately related to the the alternating
quantifiers used to define the conjecturally noncollapsing polynomial-time
hierarchy. For mathematical problems that are not universal, e.g. the Rie-
mann hypothesis, practical feasibility is all that matters. Because however
hard they may be, they do not say that discovery is hard.
It may be noticed that proving a superpolynomial lower bound for f(X)
via the flip is not very different from proving a superlinear lower bound,
because the heart of the flip, consisting of the steps I and II, is the same
whether m is superpolynomial or superlinear, and only the final step III
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differs. In other words, on any approach based on the flip, modest as well as
strong lower bounds lie on the other side of the complexity barrier, and the
main difficulty in getting to them–the complexity barrier (steps I and II)–is
the same. One may wonder if there is any other gradual way towards the
P vs. NP problem on which we could meet modest lower bounds much be-
fore strong lower bounds without having to cross the formidable complexity
barrier first. But in view of the universality of the complexity barrier, it is
plausible that this is a universal phenomenon. That is, the same thing may
well happen on any approach towards the P vs. NP problem.
The flip can also be formulated in the theory of pseudorandom genera-
tors. For that we fix an explicit NP -computable pseudorandom generator g
that conjecturally fools small circuits (assuming which P 6= NP ). We then
express this property as an IOH for g and associate a decision problem with
it. But it will be seen that this decision problem lies even higher in the
complexity hierarchy than the IOH for the P vs. NP problem; specifically
it lies in ΠBPP3 . Hence the corresponding flip, which begins at this IOH
and runs towards FOH for g through the complexity hierarchy, is harder. In
other words, this says that the theory of pseudorandom generation (deran-
domization) is in general harder than the theory of lower bounds, and hence,
hardness should be proved first and then transformed into pseudorandom
generation as per the hardness vs. randomness principle [53]. This is why
we focus on lower bounds in GCT at present.
The flip considered so far is global because it is based on a global obstruc-
tion of poly(n) size that acts as a proof certificate of hardness for all small
circuits. We may also consider a local (strong) flip based on a local (strongly)
explicit obstruction, by which we mean a table specifying a counterexample
X for each small circuit C of size m whose each row can be verified (con-
structed) in poly(n,m) time. The local flip crosses the complexity barrier
locally in the sense that a locally explicit obstruction is fundamentally dif-
ferent and better than a trivial obstruction. Better locally but not globally
because verification of the whole locally explicit obstruction still takes ex-
ponential time. The same for a local strongly explicit obstruction. In this
sense, the global flip is stronger than the local flip. The global flip also
implies the local flip if there is a polynomial time decoding algorithm, since
then from a global obstruction one can get a local strongly explicit obstruc-
tion easily. The P 6= NP conjecture is not expected to stand in the way
of this decoding since it simply amounts to spelling out what the approach
has been doing implicitly anyway. Hence intuitively the global (strong) flip
subsumes the local (strong) flip. A local strong flip is used in the proof of
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the P 6= NC result without bit operations described below (Section 6). But
it does not seem effective for the harder separation problems in view of the
algebraic degree barrier discussed there.
The complexity barrier and the flip for other problems such as the P vs.
NC and #P vs. NC problems are analogous. Though these problems are
not universal, we assume that the complexity barrier is meaningful for them
because we look at them as variants of the P vs. NP problem.
So far we have been assumming that the underlying field of computation
is the boolean field. But the P vs. NP and #P vs. NC problems can also
be defined over an arbitrary ring or field, and we are specifically interested
in the rings and fields of characteristic zero such as Z, Q and C. Let us
now explain what we mean by the (nonuniform) #P vs. NC and P vs.
NP problems in characteristic zero. By the nonuniform (characteristic zero)
version of the #P vs. NC problem we mean the permanent vs. determinant
problem [57]. It is to show that perm(X), the permanent of an n×n variable
matrix X, cannot be represented linearly as det(Y ), the determinant of an
m × m matrix Y , if m = poly(n), or more generally, m = 2log
a n, for a
fixed constant a > 0, and n → ∞. By linear representation, we mean the
entries of Y are (possibly nonhomogeneous) linear functions (over C, Q, or
Z) of the entries of X. There is an analogous characteristic zero version of
the P vs. NP problem defined in GCT1, where the role of the permanent
is played by an appropriate (co)-NP complete function and the role of the
determinant is played by an appropriate P -complete function. But we shall
not worry about it here because all the basic ideas of GCT are illustrated
in the #P vs. NC problem in characteristic zero. In this article we mostly
focus on characteristic zero because the nonuniform lower bounds over Z
are weaker implications of the corresponding ones over a finite field (the
usual case), and hence easier. But since the actual P vs. NP problem is
over a finite field (boolean), the flip over a finite field is briefly discussed
in Section 12, with a detailed discussion of the problems that arise in this
context postponed to GCT6 and 11.
The flip can also be defined for the P vs. NP and #P vs. NC problems
over fields of characteristic zero such as Q or C and for algebraically closed
fields of positive characteristic such as F¯p, the algebraic closure of the finite
field Fp, p prime. All definitions in the flip can be lifted to this setting in
the obvious way. We only give one critical definition as an illustration:
Definition 5.4 Assume that the underlying field is Q. In this case we say
that an obstruction family is easy to decode if there is a decoding algorithm
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which given the specification of an obstruction O = On,m and a small circuit
C over Q of size m (i.e. whose whole description is of bitlength m) produces
in poly(n,m, 〈O〉) time a counterexample (local obstruction) X for C whose
description has poly(n, 〈O〉) bitlength, independent of m as long as it is ≤
nlogn (say). If 〈O〉 is poly(n) the bitlength of X is then poly(n) independent
of m. In other words, smallness of obstructions independent of m is to be
preserved in the process of decoding.
Definition over F¯p is analogous.
The flip is the defining strategy of GCT. Indeed, GCT may be abstractly
defined as any (geometric) approach to the P vs. NP and related problems
based on the flip, i.e., explicit construction of obstructions (for a precise
meaning of the phrase geometric see Section 7). By based on the flip, we
mean it uses the flip as a basic guiding principle and goes for “more or
less” explicit construction of obstructions, though it does not have to be
completely explicit, i.e., some deviations and short cuts are fine and also
inevitable as long as the spirit is maintained. The present (concrete) GCT
is one such approach. It proposes a scheme for implementing the flip for
the P vs. NP and related problems via algebraic geometry, representation
theory and the theory of quantum groups. This turns out to be a nontrivial
affair, as to be expected, because of the counterintuitive and paradoxical
nature of the flip as explained above.
But before we enter into it, let us ask ourselves if the flip, i.e., explicit
construction, the root cause of all difficulties in GCT, is really necessary.
Because, to solve the lower bound problems under consideration we only
need to prove existence of obstructions, we do not have to construct them,
and moreover, the flip is only the most obvious and natural way to cross the
complexity barrier. There may exist nonobvious and unnatural (e.g. non-
constructive) ways to cross this barrier. At present, we only know that one
class of nonconstructive techniques will not work, namely the ones with prob-
abilistic flavour, which are ruled out by the natural-(probabilistic)-proof-
barrier [55]. But the probabilistic proofs constitute only a small subarea
of nonconstructive proofs, namely the ones which are of a nonspecific kind,
by which we mean nonconstructive proofs which apply to most functions
or structures under consideration. Vast areas of nonconstructive proofs in
mathematics, such as the ones in algebraic geometry and representation the-
ory, are of fundamentally different nature than probabilistic proofs: they are
nonconstructive yet very specific; i.e., they apply to only very specific func-
tions or structures under consideration. The natural-(probabilistic)-proof-
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barrier does not apply to such nonconstructive but specific proof techniques
for the reasons explained in Section 7. Indeed, one of the concrete lower
bounds of GCT to be discussed below (Theorem 8.3) has a nonconstructive
proof which applies to only very specific functions (generalized permanents)
and which bypasses the natural-proof, relativization, and algebraic-degree
(algebrization) barriers simultaneously in this setting. This gives concrete
evidence that explicit constructions are not needed to bypass these local
barriers, that they may be bypassed by nonconstructive proof techniques as
well, and that there is no reason why the universal complexity barrier too
could not be crossed by such nonconstructive techniques.
But the mathematical evidence and arguments in [GCTflip] suggest that
such unnatural ways to cross the complexity barrier may be even harder
than the natural ways as one may intuitively expect. For example, the
nonconstructive proof of the lower bound mentioned above is not much
different or easier than the explicit proof, and in fact a bit harder. We do
not go any further into such arguments here. At a concrete level, all we
can say is that we are going the natural way because there is no concrete
alternative at present. After all, as pointed out in Section 2, any approach
to the P vs. NP problem has to meet at least the criteria A, B, C, and D
stated there. We also stated there why GCT meets these criteria.
But, at present, we do not have any concrete alternative to GCT which
addresses A, B, C and D, or for that matter even one of them, and hence
there is not much that we can do but follow the most natural direction.
We now briefly describe the concrete results of GCT which address A,
B, C, and D.
6 A: The P 6= NC result without bit operations
We begin with a special case of the P 6= NC conjecture [GCTlocal], which
we are calling the P 6= NC result without bit operations, and which can
be considered to be the first concrete lower bound result of GCT. It was
proved using the weaker local form of the flip much before the (global) flip
was formalized in [GCT6,GCTflip]. It says that:
Theorem 6.1 The P -complete max-flow problem cannot be solved in polylog(N)
parallel time using poly(N) processors in the PRAM model without bit oper-
ations, where N denotes the total bit length of the input, not just the number
of input parameters.
35
The model here is the usual PRAM model with arithmetic +,−, ∗, com-
parison and branching operations, but no bit operations. It is quite realistic
and natural since it includes virtually all known parallel algorithms for alge-
braic and weighted optimization problems. Hence, this lower bound meets
the criterion A.
Its proof is based on classical algebraic geometry, though the result itself
can be stated in purely elementary and combinatorial terms; no elemen-
tary or combinatorial proof is known so far. This proof technique is locally
strongly explicit in the sense that for each branching program C (i.e. a cir-
cuit with arithmetic, branching and comparison operations) of depth logaN
and size poly(N), or even 2log
aN , for some positive constant a, it produces in
logbN time using 2log
bN processors, b = O(a), an explicit counter example
X such that the output of C on X is different from the result of the maxflow
(decision) problem. This counter example X is then a local proof-certificate
of hardness (obstruction) against C. For this reason we shall refer to this
proof technique as local GCT. (The definition of local explicitness here is a
bit relaxed in the sense that we are considering circuits of size 2polylog(N)
instead of poly(N).)
Local explicitness was not specifically mentioned in GCTlocal. But it is
easy to see [37] that the proof technique there actually produces a locally
explicit proof certificate of hardness, after a little postprocessing, though
the goal was only to prove its existence (which is why explicitness was not
mentioned). In other words, the proof technique essentially produces such a
proof-certificate explicitly whether one cares for it or not; cf. [37] for details.
Criterion A and local explicitness of the proof technique is the funda-
mental difference between this lower bound result and the earlier ones, such
as the lower bounds for constant depth circuits [10], monotone circuits [54],
or algebraic decision trees [9], which do not meet criteria A, as far as we
can see, and whose proof techniques are inherently nonconstructive. For
example, the random restriction method [10] for proving lower bounds for
constant depth circuits gives a randomized fast parallel algorithm to produce
for each such circuit C a local counter example X on which it differs from
the parity function. But the best deterministic algorithm to produce such
a counter example, based on derandomization of the switching lemma [4],
takes sequential polynomial time. Locally strongly explicit in this setting
would mean computable by a constant depth circuit (or in a relaxed sense,
say log log n depth circuit of 2polylog(n) size). Similarly, the proof of the
lower bound for sorting in the algebraic-decision-tree model [9] inherently
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requires exponential time to produce a counter example, so also the proof of
the lower bound for monotone circuits [54]. It may be conjectured that there
are (locally strongly) explicit proofs for the constant-depth or monotone cir-
cuit lower bounds. At present this is open. But the main point is that such
explicit proofs are not required to prove these lower bounds, whereas, the
only way we can prove the the P 6= NC result without bit operations at
present is essentially via locally explicit construction.
Remark: Assuming a stronger lower bound [26] for constant depth circuits,
a counter example against a constant depth circuit can be easily constructed
in polylog(N) time using 2polylog(N) processors. And similarly assumming
a stronger form of the P 6= NC result without bit operations, a counter
example against a branching circuit of polylog(N) depth and 2polylog(N)
size can be constructed by a branching circuit of polylog(N) depth and
2polylog(N) size. But what matters here is not how quickly obstructions can
be constructed once a lower bound is proved, but rather how quickly the
obstructions that are used to prove the lower bound can be constructed.
This discussion suggests that local GCT is fundamentally different from
the probabilistic techniques to which the natural proof barrier applies and
also the uniform techniques to which the relativization barrier applies.
But that is not enough for the harder lower bound problems in Figure 1
because of the third local barrier in complexity theory that was pointed out
in GCTlocal towards the end of its Chapter 7. We shall call it the algebraic
degree barrier, though it was not given any name there. This says that any
low degree or degree based proof technique, such as the one there, which
associates with a computation algebraic objects (polynomials, varieties, etc.)
and then reasons solely on the basis of the degrees of those objects will not
work for unrestricted fundamental separation problems.
This suggests that a local flip may not be good enough to prove lower
bounds for unrestricted circuits that are allowed to carry out all field opera-
tions unlike the restricted circuits for which lower bounds can be proved by
exploiting absence of fundamental field operations. Because an unrestricted
circuit is such a complex and unstructured mathematical object that its only
algebraic invariant that a local flip that works on each circuit separately can
use effectively is the degree, and the algebraic degree barrier says that such
degree based reasoning would not work.
GCTlocal also suggested in its chapter 7 an idea for crossing the alge-
braic degree barrier and this limitation of the local flip: namely, associate
with complexity classes algebraic varieties with group actions that capture
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the symmetries of computation and then reason globally on the basis of
the deeper representation theoretic structure of these varieties rather than
just their degrees. Algebraic varieties with group action have been studied
intensively in geometric invariant theory [52] for over a century.
7 Characterization by symmetries
This motivated the approach to fundamental lower bound problems via geo-
metric invariant theory that was initiated in GCT1 and 2. We now describe
the basic ideas of this approach focussing on the permanent vs. determi-
nant problem. It begins with an observation [GCT1] that the permanent
and determinant are exceptional polynomial functions, where by exceptional
we mean they are completely characterized by symmetries in the following
sense.
Let Y be a variable m×m matrix. Let Symm(Y ) be the space of homo-
geneous forms of degree m in the m2 variable entries of Y . Then by classical
representation theory det(Y ) is the only form in Symm(Y ) such that, for
any n× n invertible matrices A and B with det(A) det(B) = 1,
(D): det(Y ) = det(AY ∗B),
where Y ∗ = Y or Y t. This is so for any underlying field of computation.
Thus det(Y ) is completely characterized by its symmetries and hence is
exceptional. We shall refer to this characteristic property of the determinant
as property (D) henceforth.
Similarly by classical representation theory perm(X) is the only form in
the space Symn(X) of homogeneous forms of degree n in the entries of X
such that, for any diagonal or permutation matrices A,B,
(P): perm(X) = perm(AX∗B),
where X∗ = X or Xt with obvious constraints on the product of the
diagonal entries of A and B when they are diagonal. This is so for any
underlying field of computation of characteristic different than two. Thus
perm(X) is also completely characterized by its symmetries and hence is
exceptional. We shall refer to this characteristic property of the permanent
as property (P) henceforth.
The special functions that play the role of the determinant and the per-
manent in the P vs. NP problem in GCT1 are similarly characterized by
their symmetries in a slightly weaker sense but which is good enough for our
purposes. For the sake of completeness, let us just focus on the permanent
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vs. determinant problem here.
The Useful Property (UP), using the terminology of [55], of the per-
manent that GCT plans to use to prove a superpolynomial lower bound
is:
UP: (1) It is #P -complete, and (2) It is characterized by its symmetries.
Here (1) is just meant to ensure that the permanent is hard–anything
that ensures hardness will do here. The property that really drives GCT is
(2)–characterization by symmetries.
Let us now see how symmetries can help us tackle the local barriers; we
will turn to the universal complexity barrier later.
The relativization barrier [55] is not really relevant in the permanent
vs. determinant problem since in its statement NC-computation has al-
ready been algebrized in the form of the determinant and by now it has
been accepted in complexity theory that this barrier does not apply to
proofs that work over algebrized forms of computation, e.g., the proof of
the IP = PSPACE result. Similarly the algebraic degree [GCTlocal] (and
also algebrization [2]) barrier is also not relevant since the permanent and
determinant have the same degree and hence a proof technique that relies
just on degrees would not be able to distinguish between them. In other
words, the relativization, algebraic degree and algebrization barriers are au-
tomatically bypassed in this problem by the very nature of its statement. So
the only local barrier that really matters here is the natural proof barrier.
Let us now see how symmetries can help in bypassing this barrier. Towards
that end, we need a few definitions.
Fix any polynomial p(X) in Symn(X). It can be described by giving
all its coefficients. If the base field of computation is Fp, the finite field
of p elements, the total bit length of this description is bounded by 〈p〉D,
where 〈p〉 denote the bitlength of p and D =
(
n+n2−1
n−1
)
= 2O(n
2) is the total
number of monomials in the entries of X with degree n. We let N = 〈p〉D
be this bound on the bitlength. If the base field is Q, we stipulate that each
coefficient be of atmost b = poly(n) bitlength (we can also let b = poly(D)).
In that case the total bitlength of this description is bounded by bD, and
we let N = bD in this case. We say that a nonsingular n2 × n2 matrix σ
over the base field is a symmetry of p(X) if p(σX) = p(X), where we think
of X as an n2 vector after straightening it, say, rowwise. We say that p(X)
is completely characterized by symmetries if the only function in Symn(X)
whose symmetries contain the symmetries of p(X) is a constant multiple of
p(X).
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Definition 7.1 (a) We say that a proof technique for the permanent vs.
determinant problem (or its restricted version) makes a nontrivial use of
symmetries if it works (i.e., can prove a lower bound) only for functions p(X)
(in place of the permanent) that have nontrivial symmetries with explicit
description. By explicit description we mean in terms of poly(n) generators
with description of poly(n) bitlength. By nontrivial we mean the symmetries
do not consist of just the identity transformation or its multiples.
(b) We say that a proof technique is characterized by symmetries if it only
works for p(X) which are completely characterized by symmetries with ex-
plicit description.
The following is an analogue of Definition 2.3 in this setting.
Definition 7.2 We say that a proof technique is nonrigid if the total number
of p(X) in Symn(X) for which it works is ≥ 2N/poly(N), and mildly rigid
if this number is ≤ 2N/N c for some constant c > 0, or more generally,
≤ 2N/2poly(n). We say it is rigid if the number is ≤ 2ǫN , for some 0 ≤ ǫ < 1,
strongly rigid if the number is ≤ 2N
ǫ
, and extremely rigid if the number is
≤ 2poly(n).
Just as in Section 2, probabilistic proof techniques to which the natural
proof barrier [55] applies are nonrigid, and if a proof technique is mildly
rigid it bypasses this barrier, since it violates the largeness criterion in [55]
with N playing the role of the truth table size there.
Proposition 7.3 Let the base field be Q or a finite field Fp, with p large
enough, of poly(n) bitlength. A proof technique over such a base field that
makes nontrivial use of symmetries is rigid. A proof technique that is char-
acterized by symmetries is extremely rigid.
(The proof will appear in the full version of this paper.)
Thus a proof technique that makes nontrivial use of symmetries auto-
matically bypasses the natural proof barrier even if it is nonconstructive.
Most of the proof techniques in representation theory and algebraic geom-
etry of varieties with symmetries, i.e., geometric invariant theory [52]) are
nonconstructive. But they are rigid because they make nontrivial use of
symmetries, in contrast to the nonrigid proababilistic proof techniques to
which the natural proof barrier applies.
As we mentioned above, the useful property in GCT is UP. Hence, Propo-
sition 7.3 implies
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Corollary 7.4 The proof technique of GCT for the permanent vs. deter-
minant problem is extremely rigid.
It can be shown that this is also the case for the P vs. NP problem. This
meets criterion D in Section 2.
In Section 5 we defined abstract GCT as any geometric technique based
on the flip. Now we can explain the meaning of the phrase geometric. Since
symmetry is a fundamental geometric concept, we say that a proof technique
is geometric if it makes a nontrivial use of symmetries and is “more or less”
characterized by symmetries. By more or less, we mean characterization by
symmetries is used as a guiding principle (like the flip) and some deviations
are fine as long as the spirit is maintained. For example, the functions
that play the role of the permanent and the determinant in the P vs. NP
problem in GCT1 are not completely characterized by symmetries. But
they are more or less, enough for our purposes, and also enough to make
the technique extremely rigid.
The geometric component of abstract GCT lets it tackle the natural
proof barrier by Proposition 7.3, and the flip component lets it tackle the
complexity barrier. But, as we already remarked in Section 2, extreme rigid-
ity implied by characterization by symmetries (Proposition 7.3) is far more
than mild rigidity that suffices to cross the natural proof barrier. Rather,
characterization by symmetries is meant to be used in abstract GCT for ex-
plicit constructions which can then be used to cross the universal complexity
barrier via the flip, and these explicit constructions, as per the Rigidity Hy-
pothesis, have to be extremely rigid. In other words, though mildly rigid
nonconstructive techniques would suffice to cross the local natural proof
barrier, GCT goes for extremely rigid explicit constructions based on the
characteristic symmetry properties (P) and (D) with an eye on the universal
complexity barrier and because of the Rigidity Hypothesis.
Representation theory and algebraic geometry enter inevitably into the
study of these properties, because to understand symmetries representation
theory (of groups of symmetries) becomes indispensible, and to understand
deeper properties of representations algebraic geometry becomes indispen-
sible. Thus geometry in the form of symmetries naturally leads to algebraic
geometry, specifically, algebraic geometry of spaces with group action, i.e.
geometric invariant theory [52].
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8 A mathematical form of the #P 6= NC conjec-
ture
To illustrate the power of symmetries, we now give an application of GCT
in the form of a second concrete lower bound–namely a mathematical form
of the #P 6= NC conjecture in characteristic zero (Theorem 8.3 below).
For that we need a definition.
Definition 8.1 A polynomial function p(X1, . . . ,Xk) of any degree in the
entries of k n × n variable matrices X1, . . . ,Xk is called a generalized per-
manent if it has exactly the same symmetries as that of the permanent. This
means for all nonsingular n× n matrices Ui and Vi, i ≤ k,
p(U1X1V1, . . . , UkXkVk) = p(X1, . . . ,Xk) iff perm(UiXVi) = perm(X) ∀i.
Here Ui and Vi are as in the property (P) and the underlying field has
characteristic different than two. When n = 1, any function of k variables
x1, . . . , xk is a generalized permanent. But for general n there are far fewer
generalized permanents and their space has a highly nontrivial structure.
Observation 8.2 Assuming the nonuniform #P 6= NC conjecture in char-
acteristic zero, no #P -complete generalized permanent p(X1, . . . ,Xk) of
poly(n, k) degree can be expressed as an NC-computable polynomial func-
tion of the traces of X¯ji , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, j = poly(n, k), where X¯i = BiXiCi,
i ≤ k, for any n× n complex (possibly singular) matrices Bi and Ci.
This follows because X¯ji are clearly NC-computable.
When n = 1 and k is arbitrary, this implication is equivalent to the
original nonuniform #P 6= NC conjecture in characteristic zero, since then
all matrices becomes ordinary variables, any polynomial in x1, . . . , xk is a
generalized permanent, and a polynomial function of the traces of xi’s means
any polynomial in x1, . . . , xk. This cannot be proved unconditionally at
present. But the next case of this implication, n > 1 and k arbitrary, can
be. That is, the implication in Observation 8.2 holds unconditionally for
n > 1 and arbitrary k. In fact, in this case a stronger result holds. Namely:
Theorem 8.3 (A mathematical form of the #P 6= NC conjecture
in characteristic zero) No generalized permanent p(X1, . . . ,Xk) can be
expressed as a polynomial function of the traces of X¯ji , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, j ≥ 0,
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where X¯i = BiXiCi, i ≤ k, for any n×n complex (possibly singular) matrices
Bi and Ci.
The result also holds for any algebraically closed field of characteristic
different than two.
This result is called a mathematical form because first there is no restric-
tion here on the computational complexity of p(X1, . . . ,Xk) or the polyno-
mial in the traces. Thus it is rather in the spirit of the classical result
of Galois theory which says that a polynomial whose Galois group is not
solvable cannot be solved by any number of radical operations, without any
restriction on the number of such operations. Second, the permanent has two
characteristic properties: 1) the property (P) (mathematical), and 2) #P -
completeness (complexity-theoretic). The usual complexity theoretic form of
the #P 6= NC conjecture is a lower bound for all polynomial functions with
the #P -completeness property, whereas the mathematical form is a lower
bound for all polynomial functions with the property (P). In other words, the
complexity theoretic form is associated with the #P -completeness property
of the permanent and the mathematical form with its property (P).
This result indicates that there is thus a huge chasm between the two
adjacent cases: n = 1, k arbitrary (the usual nonuniform complexity theo-
retic #P 6= NC conjecture), and n = 2, k arbitrary (its mathematical form
above). This chasm is nothing but a reflection of the complexity barrier.
A weak form of this result, obtained by letting k = 1 and p(X1) the
usual permanent, was earlier stated in the IAS lectures in February 2009
[38]. The article [5] showed that it is too weak by giving a an elementary
linear algebraic proof. The mathematical form does not have an elementary
linear algebraic proof.
It has two proofs. The first uses only basic geometric invariant theory
[52]. Basically the proof of the weak form (or rather its nonhomgeneous
version) given in [43] works here as well with obvious modifications; Bharat
Adsul [3] has also independenly found a similar proof. But this proof is
naturalizable; i.e. it cannot cross the natural proof barrier in [55] as pointed
out in [43].
The second proof, discussed in Section 9 below, is not naturalizable, and
is based on the global flip strategy for the general permanent vs. determi-
nant problem and hence serves as a test case for the global flip in a nontrivial
special case. It produces a strongly explicit family {On,k} of (global) ob-
structions, where each On,k has a specification of O(nk) bitlength which can
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be verified and constructed in O(nk) time. This obstruction is global in the
sense that it is against all Bi’s, Ci’s and the polynomials in the traces.
This proof technique makes nontrivial use of symmetries and hence by-
passes the natural proof barrier by Proposition 7.3. In fact, it can be shown
to be strongly rigid taking the underlying field to be Q (Definition 7.2), and
hence it bypasses the natural proof barrier [55] in a strong sense. Since the
statement of the mathematical form is algebraic and degree independent,
i.e., it only relies on the property (P) and makes no mention of the degree of
p(X1, . . . ,Xk), the relativization, algebraic degree and algebrization barriers
are automatically bypassed here in the same sense that they are bypassed in
the permanent vs. determinant problem as we discussed above. Hence this
proof technique (the global flip) bypasses the relativization, natural proof
and algebraic degree barrier simultaneously, and thus addresses criterion B.
In a sense the proof technique is more important here than the lower bound
(Theorem 8.3), which is basically used as a test case for the proof technique.
9 Geometric obstructions in characteristic zero
Next we turn to formalization of the complexity barrier via the flip and thus
address criterion C. We describe this for the permanent vs. determinant
problem, the story for the P vs. NP problem being analogous. We also
point out how a restricted form of the OH that arises in the mathematical
form of the #P vs. NC problem (Section 8) can be unconditionally proved.
Up to the end of Section 10, we assume that the base field has characteristic
zero. We turn to the usual finite field case in Section 12.
For the first step of the flip (Section 5), we need a new notion of ob-
structions that is fundamentally different than the trivial obstructions. Such
obstructions based on symmetries, which we shall call geometric or repre-
sentation theoretic obstructions, are defined in GCT1 and 2.
This is done in two steps. First, GCT1 associates with the complexity
class #P a family {X#P (n,m)} of projective algebraic varieties, where by
a projective algebraic variety we mean the zero set of a system of homoge-
neous multivariate polynomials with coefficients in C. We call X#P (n,m)
the class varieties associated with complexity class #P . Each class variety
X#P (n,m) is group-theoretic in the sense that (1) it’s construction is com-
pletely characterized (determined) by the property (P) of the permanent,
(2) the general linear group G = GLl(C), l = m
2, of l× l invertible complex
matrices acts on it, and (3) the group of the symmetries of the permanent,
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Figure 5: Class varieties
which we shall refer to as Gperm, is embedded in G as its subgroup in some
way. Here action of G means it moves the points of the class variety around,
just as it moves the points of Cl around by the standard action via invertible
linear transformations.
Similarly GCT1 associates with the complexity class NC a family of
{XNC(n,m)} of group theoretic class varieties based on the property (D)
of the determinant. It also has the action of G, and Gdet, the group of the
symmetries of the determinant, is embedded as a subgroup of G in some
way.
These class varieties have the property that if perm(X), dim(X) = n,
can be represented linearly as det(Y ), dim(Y ) = m > n, then
X#P (n,m) ⊆ XNC(n,m). (2)
The goal is to show that this inclusion (2) is impossible when m =
poly(n) or more generally m = 2log
a n, a > 0 a constant. Geometric obstruc-
tions are meant to ensure this; cf. Figure 5.
To define them formally, we need to recall some basic representation
theory. By a classical result of Weyl, the irreducible (polynomial) rep-
resentations of G = GLl(C) are in one-to-one correspondence with the
partitions λ of length at most l, by which we mean integral sequences
λ1 ≥ λ2 · · · ≥ λk > 0, k ≤ l, where k is called the length of λ. The irre-
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ducible representation of G in correspondence with λ is denoted by Vλ(G),
and is called the Weyl module of G indexed by λ. Symbolically:
Irreducible representations of G
Weyl
⇐⇒ partitions λ.
Weyl module Vλ(G)←→ λ.
Weyl also proved that every finite dimensional representation of G can be
decomposed into irreducible representations–i.e., can be written as a direct
sum of Weyl modules. Thus Weyl modules are the basic building blocks of
the representation theory of G, and every finite dimensional representation
of G can be thought of as a complex building made out of these blocks.
Definition 9.1 (GCT2) A (geometric) obstruction On,m is a Weyl module
Vλ(G) that lives on X#P (n,m) but not on XNC(n,m) (Figure 5).
This means it occurs as a subrepresentation of G in the space of polyno-
mial2 functions on X#P (n,m) (which is a representation of G since G acts
on X#P (n,m)) but not in the space of polynomial functions on XNC(n,m).
See [GCT2] and [40] for a fully formal definition.
Existence of an obstruction On,m, for every n, assuming m = 2
loga n,
a > 1 fixed, implies that the inclusion (2) is not possible, since On,m cannot
live on XNC(n,m). Thus an obstruction blocks the inclusion (2). That is:
Proposition 9.2 (GCT2) Existence of an obstruction On,m, for all n→∞,
with m = 2log
a n, a > 1 fixed, implies perm(X), dim(X) = n, cannot be
represented linearly as det(Y ), dim(Y ) = m.
See GCT1,2 for mathematical evidence and justification for why such
obstructions should exist.
This proposition leads to:
Goal 9.3 (GCT2) Prove existence of such an obstruction family {On,m =
Vλn,m(G)} using the exceptional nature of perm(X) and det(Y ), i.e., using
the properties (P) and (D) in Section 7.
2Well, these are not polynomial in the exact usual sense, but let us ignore that.
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This goal can be met unconditionally in the setting of the mathematical
form (Theorem 8.3):
Theorem 9.4 There exists such an obstruction family {On,k} for the math-
ematical form of the #P 6= NC conjecture in characteristic zero (Theo-
rem 8.3).
(There is no m in this statement since Theorem 8.3 is a mathematical
lower bound that does not depend on the complexity of the polynomial in
the traces in its statement.)
This implies Theorem 8.3. The notion of obstructions here is similar to
the one in the general case.
The proof of this result is based on fundamental results of geometric
invariant theory [32, 52], the results of GCT1 and 2 based on it, and some
representation theory [6]. It is sketched in [40] with full details in GCT6. It
produces a family {On,k = Vλn,k(G)} of obstructions with a different G =
GLn(C)×· · ·×GLn(C) (2k copies) than in the general complexity theoretic
case. Furthermore this family is strongly explicit because the specification
λn,k of each On,k has O(nk) bitlength and can be constructed in O(nk) time,
in fact, in constant time by an AC0 circuit (regardless of the complexity of
the polynomial in the traces in the statement of Theorem 8.3). This also
provides a concrete evidence that the geometric obstructions in GCT1 and
2 are fundamentally different from the trivial obstructions.
10 C: Formalization of the complexity barrier in
characteristic zero
We now proceed to describe the main result of GCT for the general per-
manent vs. determinant problem in characteristic zero in the context of
Goal 9.3–this result yields formalization of the complexity barrier for this
problem.
Towards that end, we define some representation-theoretic stretching
functions. Let Fλ,n,m(k) denote the number of copies of the Weyl mod-
ule Vkλ(G) that live on X#P (n,m). Here kλ denotes the partition obtained
by multiplying each number in the integral sequence (partition) λ by k.
Let Gλ,m(k) denote the dimension of the subspace of invariants of Gdet in
Vkλ(G). Here by an invariant we mean a fix point of Gdet. i.e., a point that
does not move under its action.
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Given a polytope Q, we let fQ(k) denote the number of integer points
in the dilated polytope kQ. More generally, given a parametrized polytope
P (k) defined by a linear system of the form:
P (k) : Ax ≤ kb+ c, (3)
where A is an s× t matrix, x a variable t-vector, and b and c some constant
s-vectors, let fP (k) denote the number of integer points in P (k).
Hypothesis 10.1 (PH1) [Positivity Hypothesis] (GCT6)
(a) For every λ, n,m ≥ n, there exists an explicit parametrized polytope
P (k) = Pλ,n,m(k) such that
Fλ,n,m(k) = fP (k). (4)
If such a polytope exists it is guaranteed by a general result in GCT6 that
its dimension is poly(n) regardless of what m is. By explicit we mean it is
given by a separation oracle [25] that, given any point x, decides if x ∈ P (k)
and gives a separating hyperplane if it does not in poly(n, 〈m〉, 〈x〉, 〈k〉) time,
where 〈 〉 denotes the bitlength of description.
(b) For every m, there exist an explicit polytope Q = Qλ,m such that
Gλ,m(k) = fQ(k). (5)
If such a polytope exists it is guaranteed by a general result in GCT6 that
its dimension is poly(n) regardless of what m is as long as the length of λ is
poly(n) (as it will be in our applications). Explicitness is defined similarly.
Why PH1 should hold will be discussed in Section 11 below. PH1, in
particular, implies that Fλ,n,m(k) and Gλ,m(k) have #P formulae. Positivity
refers to the positive form of a #P -formula, i.e., the absence of any negative
sign as in the usual formula for the permanent.
Theorem 10.2 (GCT6) There exists an explicit family {On} of obstruc-
tions for the permanent vs. determinant problem for m = 2log
a n, a > 1
fixed, n→∞, assuming,
1. PH1, and
2. OH (Obstruction Hypothesis):
For all n → ∞, there exists λ such that Pλ,n,m(k) 6= ∅ for all large
enough k and Qλ,m = ∅.
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In particular, this says that the complexity barrier for verification for
the #P vs. NC (i.e. permanent vs. determinant) problem in characteristic
zero is crossed assuming PH1. Or in other words, the complexity barrier
for verification is formalized with PH1 being the mathematical hypothesis
involved in this formalization (cf. Section 5).
The complexity barrier for discovery is also crossed assuming a stronger
positivity hypothesis PH4 that we do not specify here 3. Or in other words,
the complexity barrier for discovery and hence the whole complexity barrier
is also formalized, with PH1 and PH4 being the mathematical hypotheses
involved in this formalization.
Analogous results holds for the P vs. NP problem in characteristic zero.
For mathematical evidence and justification for why OH should hold see
[GCT2,6,7,8]. This result provides a formalization of the complexity barrier
in characteristic zero. We discuss its reasonableness in Section 11 below.
This addresses criterion C.
The proof of Theorem 10.2, or rather the various results needed to justify
its statement, is based on the classical work of Hilbert in invariant theory
[52], the fundamental work in algebraic geometry on the resolutions of sin-
gularities in characteristic zero [28] and the cohomological works [11, 18]
based on this resolution; cf. [40] and GCT6 for other references.
Here OH is a complexity theoretic hypothesis in the sense that m has
to be small in comparison with n for it to hold, as in the original IOH for
this problem (which is similar to the IOH for P vs. NP problem that we
discussed before). In contrast, PH1 is a mathematical hypothesis in the
sense that there is no such restriction, and though there is a complexity
theoretic component to it, it is not expected to be “hard” like the original
P 6= NP conjecture, because the dimensions of the various polytopes are
already guaranteed to be poly(n), regardless of what m is, if they exist, and
the complexity theoretic component is basically linear programming on these
small dimensional polytopes, which is generally regarded as theoretically
“easy”.
Once PH1 and PH4 are proved, the complexity barrier is crossed and
OH becomes theoretically feasible. Though, as we have already pointed out,
actually proving OH can be a mathematical challenge. Thus, in effect, this
theorem has exchanged hard complexity theory (IOH) with hard mathemat-
3The hypothesis is called PH4 instead of PH2 because PH2 and PH3 are some other
positivity hypotheses related to PH1 that we do not discuss here
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ics (PH1+PH4+OH). What is gained in this exchange is that the P 6= NP
conjecture should not stand in the way of this hard mathematics as it seemed
to in the way of the original theoretically infeasible IOH. The two concrete
lower bounds of GCT that we discussed before illustrate that this exchange
works in nontrivial instances.
As for as proving OH is concerned, there is nothing that we can say at this
point since it depends on the explicit forms of the polytopes in PH1/PH4.
So we turn to PH1/4 next.
11 Why should the positivity hypotheses hold and
how to prove them?
Reasonability of the formalization of the complexity barrier in characteristic
zero in Theorem 10.2 critically hinges on PH1 and PH4. To show reason-
ability, we have to justify why these positivity hypotheses should hold and
why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of their proofs. Let
us just consider PH1 (b), which is a basic prototype of the general PH1 and
PH4; for a discussion of the general PH1 and PH4, see GCT6,7,8]. So we
have to now justify why PH1 (b) should hold, why the P 6= NP conjecture
should not stand in the way of its proof, and also briefly indicate GCT’s
plan for proving it.
The coefficients Gλ,m(k) that occur in PH1 (b) are known as Kroncker
coefficients in representation theory and hence we shall refer to PH1 (b) as
Kroncker PH1. It is a complexity theoretic version of the fundamental Kro-
necker problem in representation theory that has been intensively studied
in the last century and is known to be formidable. And now it lies at the
heart of this approach towards P vs. NP .
A special case of Kronecker PH1 has been solved in representation theory.
for a very special class of Kronecker coefficients called Littlewood-Richardson
(LR) coefficients. These are basically the multiplicities in the analogous
PH1 (b) that occurs in the proof of the mathematical form of the #P 6=
NC conjecture (Theorem 8.3) (formally LR coefficient is the multiplicity
of a given Weyl module in the tensor product of other two given Weyl
modules, but let us worry about its formal definition here). We shall refer
to this special case of the Kronecker PH1 that occurs in the proof of the
mathematical form as LR PH1.
Figure 6 gives a pictorial depiction of the plan to prove Kronecker PH1
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suggested in [GCT4,6,7,8]. It strives to extend the proof of LR PH1 based
on the theory of the standard quantum group [17, 30, 34], where a stan-
dard quantum group is a mathematical object that plays the same role in
quantum mechanics that the classical group G = GLn(C) plays in classical
physics. There it comes out as a consequence of a (proof of a) deep posi-
tivity result [31, 34], which we shall refer to as LR PH0. It says that every
representation of the standard quantum group has a canonical basis [30, 34]
whose structural coefficients that determine the action of the generators of
the standard quantum group on this basis are polynomials in q whose co-
efficients are all nonnegative [34] (here q stands for quantization parameter
in physics). The only known proof of this positivity result is based on the
Riemann Hypothesis over finite fields proved in [16] and the related works
[8]. This Riemann Hypothesis over finite fields is itself a deep positivity
statement in mathematics, from which LR PH1 can thus be deduced, as
shown on the bottom row of Figure 6.
If one were only interested in LR PH1, one does not need this powerful
machinery, because it has a much simpler algebraic proof. But the plan
to extend the proof of LR PH1 to Kronecker PH1 and (its other needed
generalizations) in GCT4,6,7,8 is like a huge inductive spiral. To make it
work, one needs a stronger inductive hypothesis than Kronecker PH1, more
precisely some natural generalization of LR PH0 in this context which we
shall call Kronecker PH0. Thus what is needed now is a systematic lifting of
the bottom row in Figure 6 to the top, so as to complete the commutative
diagram, so to speak.
Initial steps in this direction have been taken in GCT4,7,8. First, GCT4
and 7 constructs a nonstandard quantum group, which generalizes the notion
of a standard quantum group [17], and plays the same role in the context of
Kronecker PH1 (and the more general Plethysm PH1 which lies at the heart
of the general PH1) that the standard quantum group plays in the context
of LR PH1. Second, GCT8 gives an algorithm to construct a canonical basis
for a representation of the nonstandard quantum group that is conjecturally
correct and has the property Kronecker PH0, which is some natural gener-
alization of LR PH0, and is supported by experimental numerical evidence
generated with the help of a computer.
This numerical evidence is the main evidence for Kronecker PH0 and
hence Kronecker PH1 (i.e. PH1 (b)). It is reasonable because positivity
(Kronecker PH0) is an extremely rigid property. Specifically, the structure
coefficients involved in Kronecker PH0 are extremely complex mathematical
quantities whose computation involves summing exponentially many terms
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Figure 6: A commutative diagram
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of alternating signs. If there were no reason for them to have any spe-
cific sign, they would be positive or negative with roughly the same prob-
ability, naively speaking, and the probability that several hundred of these
mathematical quantities (which were computed) would all turn out to be of
the same sign would be absurdly small (something like 2−500, again naively
speaking). Hence, this seems to be a reasonble evidence that PH1 (b) should
hold.
This numerical evidence for positivity (PH0) is in the spirit of the ex-
isting numerical evidence for the Riemann Hypothesis, to which PH0 is
intimately related as shown in Figure 6. Existing numerical evidence for the
Riemann Hypothesis has been obtained by computing the first few zeros of
the Riemann zeta function and then checking if they really lie on the critical
line. If they do (as they do so far) that gives us a reasonable assurance that
the Riemann Hypothesis is true. Especially so because the Riemann Hy-
pothesis is an extremely rigid mathematical statement. By extremely rigid,
we mean if it were false we expect it to collapse completely and the zeros
to get scattered all over. Similarly PH0 is also expected to be an extremely
rigid property since it is intimately related to the Riemann Hypothesis. If
were wrong, we again expect it to collapse completely and the signs of the
structural coefficients to be + or − with roughly equal probability. That
PH0 holds in the substantial numerical evidence obtained so far gives us
reasonable assuarance that it should hold just like the Riemann Hypothesis.
We also have to justify why the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand
in the way of proving Kronecker PH0. This is because it is a natural math-
ematical generalization of LR PH0, and we know now that the P 6= NP
conjecture did not stand in the way of the proof of LR PH0 in [34] and also
in the way of the proof of the Riemanna Hypothesis over finite fields in [16]
on which the proof in [34] depends. The main point here is that however
hard the Riemann Hypothesis and the related positivity hypotheses in math-
ematics may be, they are not not complexity theoretic hypotheses. That is,
hard complexity theoretic statements have not been encoded in their state-
ments. Of course, we cannnot guarantee that the P 6= NP conjecture would
not stand in the way of the proof of the usual Riemann Hypothesis. But
the fact that it did not stand in the way of the proof of its analogue over
finite fields in [16] gives us a reasonable assurance that it should not stand
in the way of the proof of the usual Riemann Hypothesis either. And sim-
ilarly, also in the the way of the proofs of the related positivity hypotheses
in mathematics, however hard they may be to prove.
Finally, let us briefly discuss the plan for proving Kronecker PH0 pro-
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posed in [GCt7,8,11]. The plan is besically to complete the commutative
diagram in Figure 6. What is needed for this completion is an appropriate
nonstandard extension of the Riemann hypothesis over finite fields and the
related works [8, 16, 31, 34] from which Kronecker PH0 can be deduced.
This–the top-right corner of the diagram–is the main open problem at the
heart of this approach. All the numerical evidence for the positivity suggests
that what is needed in the top-right corner–some nonstandard extension of
the Riemann Hypothesis over finite fields–exists, but at present we have no
idea what it is. Whatever it is, the proof of PH0 promises to be a formidable
affair.
To summarize, the discussion above suggests that there is now a good
reason to believe why the positivity hypotheses should hold, and why the
P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of their proofs–that is,
why the formalization of the complexity barrier in characteristic zero (The-
orem 10.2) should be reasonable, and why this approach should thus pene-
trate the formidable circle around the P 6= NP conjecture in characteristic
zero. But there is no reason to believe that we are anywhere close to the
proofs of these positivity hypotheses. In fact, there is every reason to believe
that we may be very, very far away.
12 C: Formalization of the complexity barrier over
finite fields
Next we briefly discuss formalization of the complexity barrier via the flip
for the usual #P vs. NC and P vs. NP problems defined over finite fields
(e.g. boolean).
This is based on the following.
Conjecture 12.1 (Explicit proof conjecture) (GCT6) (Characteristic zero)
The geometric obstructions for the #P vs. NC and P vs. NP problems
in characteristic zero defined in GCT1,2, and which were discussed in Sec-
tion 9, are extremely explicit. This means they are short, easy to verify,
discover and decode (cf. Definitions 5.1,5.2,5.4). Furthermore, short geo-
metric obstructions exist in the problems under consideration. Hence, ex-
tremely explicit proofs based on these geometric obstructions exist.
(This is a strengthened form of PHflip in the earlier version of GCT6.)
54
Conjecture 12.2 (Explicit proof conjecture) (GCT6) (Positive char-
acteristic) Analogous geometric obstructions for the #P vs. NC and P vs.
NP problems over algebraically closed fields of positive characteristic as de-
fined in GCT6 are also extremely explicit. Here an algebraically closed field
is assumed to be F¯p, the algebraic closure of the finite field Fp, for p a large
enough prime of poly(n) bitlength. Furthermore, such short geometric ob-
structions exist. Hence, extremely explicit proofs based on these geometric
obstructions also exist.
Theorem 12.3 (GCT6) An extremely explicit proof for the #P vs. NC
or P vs. NP conjecture over F¯p as in Conjecture 12.2 implies an extremely
explicit proof for these problems over Fp, and also over the boolean field, i.e.,
for the usual forms of the nonuniform #P vs NC and P vs. NP conjectures.
(Similar conjectures and results apply to other problems related to the
P vs. NP problem.)
This suggests the following strategy for proving the #P 6= NC and
P 6= NP conjectures:
I Find extremely explicit proofs for the #P vs. NC and P vs. NP
problems in characteristic zero as in Conjecture 12.1.
II Lift them to get extremely explicit proofs for these problems over F¯p,
for a suitable p, as in Conjecture 12.2.
III By Theorem 12.3 this implies extremely explicit proofs over Fp and
the boolean field, the usual case.
Theorem 12.3 reduces the search for extremely explicit proofs over the
boolean field (the usual case) to the search for extremely explicit proofs
over F¯p, for a large enough p. The advantage of this reduction is that the
methods of algebraic geometry become applicable over algebraically closed
fields. But algebraic geometry in positive characteristic is harder than al-
gebraic geometry in characteristic zero. This is why the goal is to get an
extremely explicit proof in characteristic zero first (step I) and then lift
it to algebraically closed fields of positive characteristic (step II). This lift
promises to be a formidable mathematical challenge. A detailed discussion
of the problems that need to be addressed in this lift and additional relevant
problems over finite fields will appear in GCT11. Just as an example, one
of the crucial results that is used in the proof of Theorem 10.2, or rather
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a result needed to justify PH1 therein, is the resolution of singularities in
characteristic zero [28]. Lifting this resolution to positive characteristic is
one of the outstanding problems in algebraic geometry. But the P 6= NP
conjecture is not expected to stand in the way of this lift, since the difficulty
here is mathematical, not complexity theoretic. Similarly, if Conjecture 12.1
can be proved, the P 6= NP conjecture is not expected to stand in the way
of lifting its proof (as in step II) to that of Conjecture 12.2. Furthermore,
the P 6= NP conjecture is also not expected to stand in the way of decoding
obstructions either, as we already discussed in Section 5.
Hence, we will say that GCT is theoretically feasible over finite fields (the
usual case) if it is theoretical feasible in characteristic zero. This definition
of theoretical feasibility is different from the definition in Section 5. We call
the definition there direct, and the one here is indirect (because it goes via
algebraically closed fields). This indirect definition of theoretical feasibility
is also reasonable since finally theoretical feasibility of an approach is only
meant to say that the P 6= NP conjecture should not stand in the way of
the approach once it becomes theoretically feasible.
We have already discussed in Section 11 why the formalization of the
complexity barrier in characteristic zero (Theorem 10.2) is reasonable–i.e.,
we gave a reasonble justification for theoretical feasibility of GCT in char-
acteristic zero. In conjunction with Theorem 12.3 and the argument above,
it can also be taken as a reasonable justification for its theoretically feasibil-
ity in general–i.e., as a reasonable justification for the formalization of the
complexity barrier in general. Thus GCT meets criterion C in general.
But, as we also saw in Section 11, the proposed scheme for crossing
of the complexity barrier in characteristic zero via the flip based on The-
orem 10.2–i.e. for proving PH1/4–seems to require nontrivial extensions
of profound positivity results in several areas of mathematics, such as al-
gebraic geometry, representation theory, theory of quantum groups and so
forth. Proposed scheme for crossing the complexity barrier in positive char-
acteristic may need nontrivial extensions of positivity results in more related
areas of mathematics such arithmetic algebraic geometry and the theory of
automorphic forms and so forth. Thus one can see that the implementation
of this scheme for crossing the complexity barrier has turned out to be a
highly nontrivial affair.
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13 Is the complexity barrier really so formidable?
That then leads to the final inevitable questions: is the complexity barrier
really so formidable? Do we really need mathematics on this scale to cross
it? There are two concrete questions here. First, is positivity in abstract
GCT necessary? And second, is abstract GCT necessary? (Recall that by
abstract GCT we mean any approach to cross the complexity barrier via a
flip based on extremely rigid explicit constructions driven by symmetries).
Let us deal with the first question first. Here the existing mathematical
evidence and arguments [GCTflip] suggest that any abstract GCT approach
to cross the complexity barrier may have to prove some positivity results in
the spirit of PH1 and the related positivity hypotheses either explicitly or
implicitly; a detailed story and a precise meaning of the key phrase implicit
will appear in the revised version of GCTflip.
Another evidence which suggests that deep positivity may be unavoid-
able in rigid explicit constructions is provided by the fundamental work on
explicit construction of Ramanujan graphs [51]. It may be conjectured that
Ramanujan property is rigid in the sense that very few graphs with bounded
degree have this property, though a random graph is close to being Ramanu-
jan [19]. In contrast, expansion property is not rigid because a random graph
is an expander; i.e. expansion is a naturalizable [55] property. Currently
the only known proof of existence of Ramanujan graphs goes via explicit
construction, and its correctness is also based on a positivity result–namely,
the Riemann hypothesis over finite fields (for curves). But Ramanujan prop-
erty cannot be used to prove a lower bound. Hence if a nontrivial extension
of the work surrounding this positivity result is needed for extremely rigid
explicit constructions that imply hard lower bounds it should not be too
surprising.
All this suggests positivity lies at the heart of abstract GCT and if we
follow this approach we have to be willing face deep positivity questions in
mathematics.
That then leads to the second question: is abstract GCT necessary? In
this context we have already remarked that there is no reason to believe
that abstract GCT is the only approach towards P vs. NP , and that there
ought to be nonconstructive approaches as well, perhaps several. But these
unnatural approaches may turn out to be even harder than the natural
approach. And in any case, at present we do not have a concrete alternative
to GCT that meets the criteria A,B,C, and D. In other words, we do not yet
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know how to approach the P vs. NP problem without relying on extremely
rigid explicit constructions based on symmetries, and we do not yet know
how to avoid positivity in carrying out such constructions.
We also have to keep in mind that the complexity barrier is universal.
So if deep positivity is needed to cross it one way it may be be needed in one
form or the other to cross it any other way. Because that is what universal
is supposed to mean.
All this suggests that in the context of the P vs. NP problem there
may be after all something special about geometry, symmetries, extremely
rigid explicit constructions, and positivity–the defining features of abstract
GCT–and unless and until we have a concrete alternative approach to cross
the complexity barrier that meets the criteria A, B, C, and D, it may make
sense to just stick to this most obvious and natural approach to cross the
complexity barrier towards the P vs. NP and related problems.
But paradoxically this most obvious and natural approach has turned out
to be such a massive affair that it is fair to say what has been done in GCT
so far is only the easy initial part (formalization of the complexity barrier)–
easy in comparison to what remains to be done (crossing)–and the hard part
(positivity) is yet to begin. And the hard part seems so hard that without an
extensive collaboration between complexity theory and mathematics further
progress on this approach seems unlikely. It is our hope that this small initial
step towards the P vs. NP problem will lead to such extensive collaboration
between the two fields.
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